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A NEW ERA OF TAX ENFORCEMENT: FROM ‘BIG STICK’
TO RESPONSIVE REGULATION
Sagit Leviner*
This Article explores the economics of crime and compliance as the dominant approach to U.S. tax enforcement of the past three and a half decades. It evaluates
the key advantages and disadvantages of the economic model as well as its application to tax. The Article then addresses the multiplicity of taxpayer behavior and
the need and prospect of balancing the economically conceived methods of detection
and punishment against other, more cooperative, means and developing a broader
approach to tax enforcement more generally. The Article explores responsive regulation as a case study for an alternative method to tax enforcement that heavily
draws on the economic paradigm but also supplements this approach with other
theories, particularly those involving taxpayer identity, conflict escalation, and
procedural justice. The Article suggests that this broader, more balanced, and
closely tailored method of regulating responsively may enable regulators to draw on
the advantages of the economic model while alleviating some of its drawbacks. Responsive regulation may therefore constitute a superior method for regulating tax
compliance.

Introduction
The operation of the federal government is heavily dependent on
income taxes; in 2005, about 43 percent of Federal tax revenue in
the United States came from individual income taxes and another
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13 percent from corporate income taxes.1 This amounts to $927 bil2
lion and $278 billion, respectively and, compared with Fiscal Year
2004, an increase of 14.6 percent in individual income taxes and
47 percent in corporate income taxes.3 Every year, however, the
government collects billions of dollars less in tax money than it believes is owed. This difference between taxes owed and taxes
collected, otherwise known as the “tax gap,”4 is substantial and has
5
roughly tripled over the past two decades. Estimates released in
February 2006 indicate that the U.S. tax gap for the 2001 tax year
stands at approximately $345 billion,6 corresponding to a noncom7
pliance rate of about 16.3 percent of taxes owed. Through
enforcement activities and collection of other late payments, the
IRS has sought to close some of this gap, still leaving an enormous
net deficit of approximately $290 billion for the 2001 tax year.8
Maintaining the integrity of the tax system is hardly a recent
challenge for civilizations. For centuries, tax noncompliance has
been notorious for furthering a climate of disrespect, antagonism,
and selfishness in the relationship among citizens and between
them and their governments.9 When taxes are compromised, the
1.
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Combined Statement of Receipts, Outlays, and Balances 11 (2005), available at http://www.fms.treas.gov/annualreport/cs2005/receipt.pdf.
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 12.
4.
According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) the tax gap is “the difference between what taxpayers should have paid and what they actually paid on a timely basis.” I.R.S.
News Release IR-2006-28, IRS Updates Tax Gap Estimates (Feb. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154496,00.html; see also I.R.S. News Release FS2005-14, Understanding the Tax Gap (Mar. 2005) (“The tax gap measures the extent to
which taxpayers do not file their tax returns and pay the correct tax on time.”), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=137246,00.html. Others clarify that “the tax gap
is not equal to the amount of additional revenue that would be collected by stricter enforcement.” Luigi Alberto Franzoni, Tax Evasion and Tax Compliance, in 6 Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics 52, 53 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
5.
Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the SelfAdjusting Penalty, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 569, 574 (2006).
6.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4.
7.
The Tax Gap and How to Solve It: Testimony Before the Senate Committee on the Budget,
109th Cong. 3 (2006) (written testimony of Mark Everson, Commissioner, IRS), available at
www.senate.gov/~budget/democratic/testimony/2006/everson_taxgap021506.pdf [hereinafter The Tax Gap]. Both of these numbers fall at the high end of the range of estimates
provided by the IRS in the spring of 2005. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4.
8.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. Notice, however, the statement of the
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Mark W. Everson, that “the vast majority of
Americans pay their taxes accurately and are shortchanged by those who don’t pay their fair
share.” The Tax Gap, supra note 7.
9.
John S. Carroll, A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 Taxpayer
Compliance 228, 228 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989); see also Frank A. Cowell, Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion 101–24 (1990) (claiming
that noncompliance can generate resentment among taxpayers, eventually escalating to
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tax system becomes a deficient means for raising money to pursue
and implement government goals, and actual tax collection fails to
reflect the statutorily intended taxation plan.10 This creates disturbing results such as upsetting the distribution of the tax burden and,
11
more generally, wealth in society. For instance, when wealthy citizens have better opportunities and means to reduce their tax
liabilities compared with other less well-off citizens, the taxes collected are likely to result in a more regressive and less equitable
system than Congress intended.12 Abusive tax practices also jeopardize horizontal equity when opportunities to reduce or eliminate
13
tax liability are distributed unequally. More generally, in a country
with fixed revenue requirements, reducing the tax liability for any
given sector of taxpayers, in effect, means that higher and more
distortionary taxes are levied on others.14 All of this, in turn, produces inefficiencies as market competition is affected by the
unequal distribution of the tax burden and economic practices
motivated by tax abuse, translating to a deadweight loss to society.15
Despite the evident benefits entailed in improving tax compliance, several factors, including the complexity of the Tax Code, the
magnitude and persistent levels of noncompliance, and democratic
principles that restrain government agencies from interfering with
the private conduct of citizens, combine to make it so that no tax
system achieves perfect compliance.16 Still, due to the size of the tax
gap, even a small or moderate reduction in existing noncompliance
can yield substantial returns and improve the government’s ability to
pursue its goals. According to a 2004 Government Accountability
Office report, each one percent reduction in the U.S. net tax gap is

these taxpayers undertaking acts of noncompliance as a form of protest against the government and the tax administration or as a means of equalizing the tax burden).
10.
See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Why People Pay Taxes: Introduction, in Why People Pay Taxes
1, 1 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“It is impossible to understand the true impact of a country’s
tax system by looking only at the tax base and the tax rates applied to that base. A critical
intermediating factor is how the tax law is administrated and enforced. What is apparently a
highly progressive tax rate structure may, in fact, be proportional, or even regressive, if taxes
levied on the wealthy are not collected. What is apparently a tax base finely tuned to reflect
individual differences in ability to pay may, in fact, produce a capricious distribution of tax
liabilities if the tax law is selectively enforced.”).
11.
See Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and Efficiency of
the Income Tax, 49 Nat’l Tax J. 135, 140–42 (1996).
12.
See James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ.
Literature 818, 818 (1998).
13.
Franzoni, supra note 4, at 55.
14.
Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 818.
15.
See Franzoni, supra note 4, at 55; Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 818.
16.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4 (indicating the administrative inaptness to completely eliminate the tax gap).
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likely to yield more than $2.5 billion annually.17 Thus, a 10 to 20
percent reduction could translate to $25 to $50 billion or more in
18
additional revenue annually.
In recent years the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has taken a
number of steps to bolster enforcement and ease the tax gap. The
IRS budget request for Fiscal Year 2005 was $10.674 billion, $490
million more than the amount proposed for Fiscal Year 2004.19
Three hundred million dollars of this increase was allocated for
20
enforcement. The enforcement budget was used to raise the
number of audits of high-income taxpayers to 221,000 reviews in
21
Fiscal Year 2005, the highest number of reviews in 10 years. Similarly, the number of audits of all taxpayers increased to 1.2 million
in 2004, 20 percent more than the year before.22 As a result of these
steps and others, the IRS reported an increase in its enforcement
revenue of nearly 40 percent, from a total of $33.8 billion in 2001
to $47.3 billion in 2005.23 However, despite these increases in enforcement and revenue, the difference between taxes owed and
24
taxes collected in the United States remains considerable. This
raises the question whether the steps taken thus far are sufficient to
17.
Tax Compliance: Reducing the Tax Gap Can Contribute to Fiscal Sustainability but Will Require a Variety of Strategies: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Finance (GAO-05-527T3), 109th
Cong. 3, 16 (2005) (statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the United States),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05527t.pdf.
18.
Id. at 16 (adding that a significant reduction of the tax gap is likely to depend on
improvement in tax compliance rates).
19.
Internal Revenue Serv., Budget in Brief, Fiscal Year 2005, at 4 (2004).
20.
The remainder of the increase, $190 million, was allotted for reinvestments in consumer service, maintenance of existing levels of performances, and physical infrastructure
consolidation. See id.
21.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4. Here, high-income taxpayers are defined as those taxpayers earning $100,000 or more annually. Id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. The increase in revenue between 2001 and 2005 due to examination measures
is $9.8 million, and from document matching is $1.5 million, totaling $11.3 million of additional tax money collected. This is compared with an increase in revenue of $2.2 million due
to other forms of collection during that time. See id. (enforcement revenue tbl.). See, however, more recent reductions in enforcement and revenue. According to IRS estimates, in
2008 the audit rate of individuals fell to 1.01% (from 1.03% in 2007), a decrease that was
most pronounced with respect to high wealth individuals where the audit rate fell to 5.57%
from 6.84% in 2007. In 2008 collections also fell for the first time in a decade, down 4.7%
from 2007, to $56.4 billion. Internal Revenue Serv., Fiscal Year 2008 Enforcement
Results, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/2008_enforcement.pdf.
24.
Importantly, the tax gap estimates take only certain components of income misreporting into account. These estimates do not consider, for instance, taxes that are legally
minimized. Once accounted for, tax noncompliance (broadly defined) may provide a more
realistic (albeit gloomy) description of taxpaying behavior and the challenge of protecting
the integrity of the tax system. Note, for example, recent headlines suggesting that twothirds of corporations paid zero income taxes in the U.S. between 1998 and 2005. Jennifer
Kerr, Most Companies in US Avoid Federal Income Taxes, ABC News, Washington DC, August 12, 2008, available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=5561455.
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alleviate the problem of tax noncompliance. If not sufficient, what
alternatives are available to government agencies and other regulatory institutions?
This Article explores one alternative solution to the problem of
noncompliance. It suggests that expansion of the traditional tax
compliance analysis to include responsive elements of regulation,
as illustrated in the Australian Tax Office’s (ATO) approach to tax
enforcement, may yield a more useful and forward-looking method
for improving tax compliance than those available under other systems. The responsive regulation approach is based on the
proposition that effective enforcement requires a dynamic and
gradual application of less to more severe sanctions and regulatory
interventions.25 This range of sanctions and interventions balances
traditional authoritarian deterrence with strategies that rely on
persuasion and encouragement through three states of communication: cooperation, toughness, and forgiveness.26 The Australian
approach also advocates developing a deeper understanding of the
motives, circumstances, and characteristics of taxpayers, so tax authorities can tailor enforcement to more effectively deliver
27
compliance. With responsive regulation, the intent is to preserve
the basic principles of economic analysis that view taxpayers as rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility. Responsive
regulation goes a step further, however, and also considers other
parameters, including the way that society, morality, and ethics affect taxpayer behavior and, particularly, the manner in which the
taxpayer-tax administration relationship shapes compliance.
Given that the ATO first introduced responsive regulation in its
administration during the late 1990s, compliance improvement
data on this approach to tax is somewhat limited at this point. This
Article therefore focuses on fleshing out the underlying principles
and rationales of the Australian paradigm. In a few years, the Australian model can be evaluated against more comprehensive data and
empirical work. In the meantime, the interest countries such as the
United Kingdom and Canada show in the Australian model, and
the implementation of this approach in New Zealand and East
25.
John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade (1985).
26.
Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate (1992).
27.
See Cash Economy Task Force, Australian Taxation Office, Improving Tax
Compliance in the Cash Economy 18–21 (1997) [hereinafter Cash Economy Task Force
1997], available at http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39065.pdf; Cash Economy
Task Force, Australian Taxation Office, Improving Tax Compliance in the
Cash Economy 19–21 (1998) [hereinafter Cash Economy Task Force 1998], available at
http://www.ato.gov.au/content/downloads/SB39073.pdf.
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Timor, may indicate that the responsive interpretation to tax en28
forcement is more than a passing phase.
Part I of this Article discusses the main reasons tax compliance is
a challenge for tax administrations and the manner in which economic analysis offers important insights into and methodological
guidance for understanding tax noncompliance and fostering compliance. Part II reviews the origins of the economic analysis of
compliance, explains how the economic model was introduced
into the area of tax enforcement, and explores recent developments and challenges in that area. Part III discusses key advantages
and disadvantages of the economic approach to tax enforcement
and concludes that the economic model is persuasive in many respects yet flawed in others. In Part IV, the Article introduces the
Australian approach to tax enforcement, and explains the manner
in which this approach draws on the economics of crime and compliance model and how it moves beyond the economic realm to
rely on other theories. The Article suggests that as a result of this
multi-faceted approach, the Australian paradigm has the potential
to capture the strengths of the economic model while also addressing some of its drawbacks. Part V summarizes and concludes,
suggesting that the Australian approach may mark the beginning
of a new era of tax enforcement.
The focus of this Article is personal income tax compliance, although much of the discussion provides important insight into
other tax and regulatory areas. Regrettably, there are many important issues that fall outside the scope of this Article. Most notably,
the Article does not explicitly discuss the underground economy,
or the difficulties with collecting taxes internationally, nor does it
consider the relative advantages and disadvantages of sales taxes or
Value Added Tax (VAT) compared with income taxation in terms
of their ease of enforcement. These issues, although important, are
left for future inquiries.
28.
For an interesting discussion on the implementation of responsive regulation in
tax enforcement in Australia, New Zealand, and East Timor, see Jenny Job, Andrew Stout &
Rachael Smith, Culture Change in Three Taxation Administrations: From Command-and-Control to
Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Policy 84 (2007) (focusing on issues of organizational culture and change). For an OECD report on tax enforcement that references the Australian
model and related research efforts, see Forum on Tax Administration Compliance SubGroup, Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Compliance Risk
Management: Managing and Improving Tax Compliance (2004), http://www.oecd.org/
dataoecd/44/19/33818656.pdf.
For a more recent analysis, this time with respect to U.S. tax administration, see Marjory
E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2007
Report to Congress 138 (2007) (exploring the role of “tax morale” in the IRS’s enforcement
and research efforts).
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I. The Problem and Modeling of Tax Compliance
The difficulties of tax enforcement emerge, largely, because the
variables that define the tax base are not usually observable.29 Without detailed information about the taxpayer’s transactions and her
overall financial and other tax-related standing, no one but the
taxpayer can know whether she is truthful and accurate in her reports to the tax authority. To a certain degree, verifying
information may be obtained by means of costly audits or thirdparty reporting, such as by banks and employers.30 Assuming this
information is acquired in a timely and cost-efficient manner and is
found to be accurate and coherent, the tax base becomes verifiable.31 In other cases, however, as when the taxpayer is involved in
transactions that are beyond the reach of the tax authority and official statistics, including where income is received by way of cash
transactions, the tax base is almost impossible to verify.32
The taxpayer is able to use the unobservable nature of the tax
base to her advantage, or in other cases make innocent mistakes
and report partial or otherwise incorrect figures on her tax return
in a manner that is difficult to detect. At times it can also be difficult for the tax administration to clearly identify those taxpayers
who are most likely to be noncompliant. Key determinants for taxpayer compliance, such as the perceived probability of detection
and the benefits of evasion, can be tricky to capture and compute.
These shortcomings make it extremely complicated to not only
detect or correct noncompliance but also to study and better understand its possible causes and facilitators. Amidst these
difficulties, economic analysis intervenes and offers methodological guidance for, and important insights into, understanding and
addressing the issue of tax noncompliance.
Over the past four decades, the economic analysis of compliance
has played a pivotal role in elucidating the issue of compliance and,
specifically, pinpointing those factors involved in the lack of compliance of taxpayers. As they examine compliance issues, analysts
simplify the many complexities involved to produce a coherent

29.
See Robert A. Kagan, On the Visibility of Income Tax Law Violations, in 2 Taxpayer
Compliance 76 (Jeffrey A. Roth and John T. Scholz eds., 1989); see also Franzoni, supra note
4, at 54–55 (adding that tax evasion and avoidance and their harmful consequences may in
fact be worsened by laws or even constitutions when they are drafted as if the tax base is
observable because this limits the corrective instruments available to the government, such
as setting tax rates according to their degree of enforceability).
30.
Kagan, supra note 29, at 79.
31.
Franzoni, supra note 4, at 54.
32.
Id.; Kagan, supra note 29, at 88.
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framework that draws attention to the essential questions at hand.33
Modeling tax compliance also allows analysts to examine and compare the possible consequences of different enforcement
strategies. This, in turn, enables policymakers to deliberate on and
34
offer alternative policy instruments to employ.
Notwithstanding valuable information that becomes available
through economic analysis, economic models provide, at best,
“tentative guidance . . . in well-specified circumstances.”35 Because
models, by definition, simplify a much more complex reality, they
can be subject to criticism as being unrealistic.36 Improvements in
data and methodology help bring models closer to real-life scenarios. All models, however, have their shortcomings, and these
must be recognized when models are implemented to generate
policy recommendations. With these limitations in mind, the next
Part of this Article will introduce the basic elements of the economic model of compliance with the law. It will then explore the
application of the economic model to taxation and will discuss developments and challenges in that area.
II. Economic Analysis and Tax Enforcement
A. Criminal Law Enforcement and the Deterrence Hypothesis
“The profit of the crime is the force which urges a man to delinquency:
the pain of the punishment is the force employed to restrain him from
it. If the first of these forces be the greater, the crime will be committed;
if the second, the crime will not be committed.” 37
The principal model for analyzing compliance with the law derives from the classic work in utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and
33.
See John Creedy, Tax Modelling, in 1 Taxation and Economic Behaviour: Introductory Surveys in Economics 133, 135–36 (John Creedy ed., 2001).
34.
Id. at 135.
35.
Id. at 136; see also Frank Cowell, Carrots and Sticks in Enforcement, in The Crisis in
Tax Administration 230, 231 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).
36.
See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical
Analysis, 1 J. Pub. Econ. 323, 325 (1972) (“Even though we ignore these points, we hope to
have retained enough of the structure of the problem to make the theoretical analysis
worthwhile.”); see also Leslie Book, Study of the Role of Preparers in Relation to Taxpayer Compliance with Internal Revenue Laws, in Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2 2007 Report to Congress
44, 55–57 (2007) (discussing the importance of utilizing various alternative models to understand taxpayer compliance).
37.
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law (1788), reprinted in 1 Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy Bentham, at 399 (John Hill Burton ed., 1843) (footnote
omitted).
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Cesare Beccaria who laid the foundation for a framework of analysis that tells a relatively straightforward and realistic story of human
behavior.38 The basic premise of the utilitarian theory is that people
behave rationally in order to maximize their expected utility.39 In
the context of compliance the assumption is that, facing several
plausible courses of action, some of which are legal while others
are not, individuals choose whether to commit a crime or not
based on which option has the better prospect of increasing their
utility.40 The economic approach to crime and compliance, although influential at the time of its conception, received very little
attention from later theorists and policymakers until Gary Becker
modernized it in his path-breaking article Crime and Punishment: An
41
Economic Approach.
In the decades prior to the publication of Becker’s article, discussions of crime were dominated by the opinion that criminal
behavior is caused by mental illness and social oppression and that
criminals are no more than victims of their life circumstances.42
These attitudes began to have a major influence on social policy, as
governments enacted laws to expand the rights of those who were
essentially lawbreakers.43 Becker not only rejected the presumption
that criminals are helpless victims of their situation but he also took
issue with the associated policy implications, which, according to

38.
Id. See generally Jeremy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (Richard Hildreth
trans., Harcourt, Brace & Co. 1931); Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments
(David Young trans., Hackett Pub. Co. 1986) (1764); Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. Pol. Econ. 385, 391 (1993) (“One reason why the
economic approach to crime became so influential is that the same analytical apparatus can
be used to study enforcement of all laws, including minimum wage legislation, clean air acts,
insider trader [sic] and other violations of security laws, and income tax evasions.”).
39.
According to the utilitarian model, people have preferences and choose among
different alternatives in a manner that maximizes the likelihood of obtaining their preferred
outcomes. The expected utility of any decision alternative is assessed by identifying the possible consequences or outcomes, assigning a desirability or utility to each outcome, and
attaching likelihoods to the different outcomes. Each outcome is multiplied by its likelihood, and the discounted outcomes, or weight, are summed to “create” the expected utility
of that alternative. The alternative with the most favorable expected utility is then selected
and implemented. See Carroll, supra note 9, at 229; see also Marco R. Steenbergen, Kathleen
M. McGraw & John T. Scholz, Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws
Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes? in Why People Pay Taxes 9, 14 (Joel Slemrod ed.,
1992) (suggesting a dominance of self-interest, particularly, in the study of human behavior
in public choice theories of economics, as well as motivational theories in psychology).
40.
See generally Bentham, supra notes 37–38; Beccaria, supra note 38.
41.
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169
(1968).
42.
Becker, supra note 38, at 390.
43.
Id.
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him, “reduced the apprehension and conviction of criminals and
44
provided less protection to the law-abiding population.”
Instead of adhering to theories of mental illness and social oppression, Becker’s work explores the possibility that criminal
behavior is rational and that regulators and policymakers should
address it as such.45 Becker returns to the utilitarian principles of
Bentham and Beccaria to suggest that, ultimately, individuals decide whether to commit a crime or obey the law based on a
reasoned calculation of the costs and benefits of either course.
Since the final consequences of criminal behavior are generally
uncertain, Becker draws on the common assumption that people
act as if they are maximizing expected utility and that utility is a
positive function of income. In Becker’s words:
[A] person commits an offense if the expected utility to him
exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other
resources at other activities. Some persons become “criminals,” therefore, not because their basic motivation differs
from that of other persons, but because their benefits and
costs [resulting from compliance and noncompliance with the
law] differ.46
Focusing on the costs and benefits associated with human behavior, the “deterrence hypothesis” emerges. It suggests that, if
individuals are rational decisionmakers seeking to maximize expected utility, the way to foster compliance with the law is to deter
individuals from acts of noncompliance by ensuring that the expected utility of noncompliance will be lower than the expected
utility of compliance.47 In particular, Becker’s analysis advances the
proposition that public resources ought to be allocated to policy
measures of two kinds: one aimed at detecting noncompliers, and
the other designed to ensure devastating consequences for offend44.
Id.
45.
Despite Becker’s approach to crime, concepts like depravity, insanity, abnormality,
deviance, and deprivation are still widely used to characterize those who commit crimes
outside of the realm of the economic analysis, especially for hate crimes and crimes of passion. See Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior, in 5 Encyclopedia of Law and
Economics 345, 345 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). For that matter,
criminologists have generally been more interested in rehabilitation and treatment, and
many are reluctant to accept studies of deterrence in general and models of criminal behavior based on rational choice theory in particular. However, these scholars still pay close
attention to the empirical studies in the economics of crime literature, and sociologists have
recently carried out similar research. See id. at 346; Becker, supra note 38, at 391 (citing literature).
46.
Becker, supra note 41, at 176.
47.
Id. at 176–79.
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ers.48 According to this line of thinking, balancing enforcement
resources between these two measures becomes the regulatory key
to effectively deter offenders and promote compliance as the rational choice of behavior.49
B. The Allingham-Sandmo Model of Tax Evasion
Compared with the general economic theory of crime, its tax
noncompliance counterpart is a relatively recent development, dating back a little over thirty-five years and, particularly, to the muchcited article Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, by Michael
50
Allingham and Agnar Sandmo. Allingham and Sandmo extend
Gary Becker’s work on the economics of crime and compliance to
taxation using modern risk theory. Their 1972 publication serves as
a cornerstone in this area, leading to a large number of scholarly
51
contributions either commenting or expanding on their essay.
48.
In a recent article, Becker explains that he first began to think about crime in the
late 1960s after driving to Columbia University for an oral examination of a student in economic theory. Becker was late and had to decide quickly whether to take the extra time to
put his car in a parking lot or risk getting a ticket for parking illegally on the street. Confronted with this dilemma, Becker contemplated the faster solution of parking on the street
and assessed the likelihood and severity of getting a ticket for violating the city parking regulations. He reached the conclusion that it was worth it for him to take the risk and park on
the street. As Becker was walking away from his car to the examination room, it occurred to
him that “the city authority had probably gone through a similar analysis” and that “[t]he
frequency of their inspection of parked vehicles and the size of the penalty imposed on violators should depend on their estimates of the type of [rational] calculations potential
violators like me would make.” Interestingly enough, Becker did not get a ticket for his parking violation that day. Becker, supra note 38, at 389–90 (emphasis added).
49.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 208 (“The conclusion that ‘crime would not pay’
is an optimality condition and not an implication about the efficiency of the police or
courts; indeed, it holds for any level of efficiency, as long as optimal values of p and f [i.e.,
the probability and severity of punishment] appropriate to each level are chosen.”); see also
id. at 209 (“The main contribution of this essay, as I see it, is to demonstrate that optimal
policies to combat illegal behavior are part of an optimal allocation of resources.”).
50.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36. Other early attempts to model tax evasion after the economics of crime include, for example, Serge-Christophe Kolm, A Note on Optimum
Tax Evasion, 2 J. Pub. Econ. 265 (1973) and Balbir Singh, Making Honesty the Best Policy, 2 J.
Pub. Econ. 257 (1973).
51.
Note that from the outset Becker intended his analysis to provide a theory broadly
applicable to compliance including compliance in the context of tax reporting. See Becker,
supra note 41, at 170 (“Although the word ‘crime’ is used in the title to minimize terminological innovations, the analysis is intended to be sufficiently general to cover all violations,
not just felonies—like murder, robbery, and assault, which receive so much newspaper coverage—but also tax evasion . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Allingham & Sandmo, supra
note 36, at 323 (“On the one hand our approach is related to the studies of economics of
criminal activities, as e.g. in the papers by Becker (1968) and by Tulkens and Jacquemin
(1971). On the other hand it is related to the analysis of optimal portfolio and insurance
policies in the economics of uncertainty, as in the work by Arrow (1970), Mossin (1968a)
and several others.”).
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Like previous research in crime, Allingham and Sandmo build
their analysis around the individual, this time the taxpayer, who
52
becomes the potential criminal. Their model, which I will call the
A-S model or framework, explores the decision to evade taxes at
the moment when the taxpayer is filling in her tax return. The issue of compliance is presented as a portfolio allocation problem in
which the taxpayer must decide what portion of her income to allocate to various activities, some of which are legal (income
declared on the tax return), while others are illegal (income not
declared).53 Specifically, the model examines the way compliance
decisions relate to how the taxpayer perceives that her economic
opportunities and well-being are affected by enforcement measures, such as audit probability and the severity of sanctions, as well
as by the Tax Code more generally, including applicable tax rates.
Allingham and Sandmo begin their analysis by considering a basic model in which the authorities decide on the Tax Code and the
enforcement mechanisms, while each taxpayer acts as if her own
actions do not influence these decisions.54 The taxpayer is taken to
be familiar with the tax legislation, the probability of an audit, the
taxes she is liable for, and the penalty for failing to pay that amount
in the event that she is caught and convicted.55 Other important
simplifications usually include the assumptions that the taxpayer is
56
risk-averse, that the tax system is income-based, and that the tax52.
See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323 (“Our objective in this paper is
. . . analyzing the individual taxpayer’s decision on whether and to what extent to avoid taxes
by deliberate underreporting.”).
53.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323. Unlike Becker’s model of compliance
where the income from crime is a variable separate from legal income, in the A-S framework
the taxpayer’s initial income becomes a reference point where tax evasion will be undertaken if the expected utility from evasion is higher than the utility of the initial income. See
Eide, supra note 45, at 347. A somewhat similar analysis to the portfolio allocation framework was construed such that a person allocates her time (compared with income or wealth)
between legal and illegal activities. See, e.g., Peter Schmidt & Ann D. Witte, An Economic
Analysis of Crime and Justice: Theory, Methods, and Applications (1984); Kenneth I.
Wolpin, An Economic Analysis of Crime and Punishment in England and Wales 1894–1967, 86 J.
Pol. Econ. 815 (1978).
54.
Allingham and Sandmo label this framework as “the static analysis.” See Allingham
& Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324–30.
55.
Id. at 324. For a useful review of these assumptions, see, for example, Brian Erard,
The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in Why People Pay Taxes 95, 96 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“In these models, taxpayers are already aware of the (exogenous) probability
of audit and detection; they know their true taxable incomes; and they are familiar with the
penalties for noncompliance.”).
56.
Allingham and Sandmo take the common assumption that taxpayers’ behavior
conforms to the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for behavior under uncertainty where
individuals’ cardinal utility function is increasing and concave, featuring income as its only
parameter. Marginal utility is assumed to be positive and decreasing, so that taxpayers are
generally risk averse. In other words, at some point, the taxpayer would not opt for evasion
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payer’s actual income is exogenously given and is known to the
taxpayer but not to the government’s tax collector.57 Tax is assumed
to be levied at a proportional rate on declared income, which
represents the taxpayer’s decision variable.58 With some constant
probability, the tax authority may investigate the taxpayer and re59
veal the actual amount of her income. If this happens, the
taxpayer would have to pay tax on any amount of undeclared in60
come at a penalty rate that is higher than the tax rate. Finally, the
decision whether to evade or comply is analyzed as if it is the only
dilemma with which the taxpayer is concerned,61 and the analysis
ignores possible inter-relationships between this decision and other
economic choices the taxpayer may face including, for example,
decisions concerning labor supply and tax avoidance.62 The basic
63
A-S analysis also assumes that time is composed of a single period
64
and that only one form of evasion is available.
Patterned after the utilitarian paradigm, the taxpayer is taken to
follow expected utility theory and make compliance decisions
based solely on the consequences for her net income.65 The A-S
framework accordingly implies that the taxpayer is tempted to seize
the opportunity of cheating on her taxes whenever it is worth the
chance of being caught and bearing the associated penalties.66 The
despite likely increases in expected utility because the risk would be too high for her taste.
See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324.
57.
Id. at 324. We can assume, more realistically, that part of the taxpayer’s income is
known to the government such as due to information provided by third party reporting. In
this case, the analysis would apply to that portion of the income that remains unknown,
because it would not pay for the taxpayer to try to avoid taxes on the known part. See id. at
324 n.1; see also, e.g., infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
58.
Id. at 324.
59.
Id.
60.
Id. But see Shlomo Yitzhaki, A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 3 J.
Pub. Econ. 201 (1974) (modifying the analysis such that the taxpayer pays penalty on the
amount of tax missing due to evasion (rather than on undeclared income), a practice that is
common in countries such as United States and Israel).
61.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 323–32.
62.
Id. at 323.
63.
Cf. id. at 332–37 (laying out the dynamic case); see also Cowell, supra note 35, at 240
(explaining that with regard to the basic A-S model, one can imagine that each year essentially the same gamble takes place without there being any “memory” in the system).
64.
See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324.
65.
Id.
66.
The taxpayer has a choice between two main strategies: She may declare her income in full or she may declare less than that amount; in the latter case, she will also need to
decide what portion of her income to declare and what portion to conceal. If the taxpayer
chooses to conceal some or all of her income, her payoff will depend not only on her decision regarding whether and to what extent to evade taxes, but also on whether she is
investigated by the tax authorities and becomes subject to some or all of the associated penalties. The taxpayer is therefore confronted with a classic dilemma of choice under
uncertainty, which has also been described as a “lottery calculation” or a “gamble.” Under
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taxpayer compares the expected utility gained from evasion—
considering the taxes she will not pay—with the expected cost of
the penalty—the nominal penalty discounted by the probability
that this penalty will be imposed.67 If caught, the taxpayer will need
to pay the penalty for evasion coupled with the shortfall in tax.
When the net expected value of evasion is positive, the taxpayer
will evade, and, when it is negative, she will comply.68
Examining the relationship among the taxpayer’s (1) actual income, (2) her tax rate, (3) penalty rate, (4) probability of detection,
and (5) tax evasion, the Allingham and Sandmo analysis leads to
results that partly contradict available compliance data, suggesting
that there is no clear relationship among actual income, the tax
69
rate, and evasion. However, the results for the penalty rate for evasuch conditions, the taxpayer’s failure to report her true income may not necessarily subject her to the full extent of the law. Therefore evasion is not always an irrational course
of action. If the taxpayer is not investigated, she is better off when evading than when being
honest. If she is investigated and punished, she might be worse off—depending on the severity of the penalty imposed. See Cowell, supra note 35, at 231–33. In this context, an audit,
for example, “is simply an instance of a taxpayer losing the ‘tax lottery.’ ” Erard, supra note
55, at 96.
67.
See, e.g., Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,
in 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1423, 1451–52 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein
eds., 2002); Becker, supra note 41, at 176 (arguing that taxpayers consider expected penalties rather than nominal ones).
68.
Consider an example given by John Carroll where a taxpayer contemplates an illegal deduction that reduces the tax she must pay by $100 and where the probability of an
audit is estimated to be 5 percent. If audited, the taxpayer would have to pay the $100 plus a
penalty of 50 percent of the income owed, here $50. To simplify the example, Carroll ignores interest rates and treats the taxpayer as risk-neutral. According to this scenario, the
analysis would involve two main alternatives: (1) not taking the deduction, in which case the
result is some initial amount of income, W, and (2) taking the deduction. There are two
possible outcomes to taking the deduction: (1) W plus $100 if the taxpayer is not audited,
and (2) W minus $50 if she is audited and punished. The expected utility of being honest is
U(W), and the expected utility of cheating is .95[U(W+100)]+.05[U(W-50)]. As a point of
reference for a risk-neutral taxpayer, Carroll conveniently assumes that U(W)=0 and that
U(W+X)=X, so that the expected utility of being honest is 0 compared to 92.5 for cheating
(.95 x 100 – .05 x 50). With the expected utility significantly higher for noncompliance
compared with compliance, the taxpayer in this example is expected to cheat. Carroll, supra
note 9, at 229–30.
69.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 329–30. As Sandmo explains, in the original A-S model an increase of the tax rate has an ambiguous effect on tax evasion because
there is an income effect which is negative: higher taxes make the taxpayer poorer and,
therefore, less willing to take risks. But there is also a substitution effect that works in the
direction of increased evasion. The substitution effect on evasion in the A-S model occurs
because the net penalty (i.e., the difference between the penalty rate and the tax rate) goes
down when the tax rate increases due to the fact that the penalty rate is held fixed when the
tax rate increases. The decrease in the net penalty in effect increases the incentive to underreport income. This substitution effect would be present under the more general but weaker
assumption that the penalty rate increases less than proportionally with the tax rate. See
Agnar Sandmo, The Theory of Tax Evasion: A Retrospective View, 58 Nat’l Tax J. 643, 647–48
(2005). However, if the fine is imposed on the evaded tax (instead of on the evaded income)
the substitution effect disappears because the penalty increases with the tax rate. In this
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sion and the probability of detection are unambiguous. The A-S model
confirms Becker’s analysis in finding that a higher penalty rate or
probability of detection tends to discourage evasion.70 While the
expected tax yield falls with a decrease in the probability of detection, the loss of tax revenue can generally be compensated by an
increase in penalty rate, such that the two enforcement alternatives
emerge as substitutes for one another.71
C. The Economic Analysis of Tax Compliance: Beyond the
Allingham-Sandmo Model
The economic approach to tax compliance, as it appears in the
A-S framework, reduces enforcement policies to two key considerations: the penalty rate and the probability of detection. In other
words, the A-S analysis suggests that in order to control evasion,
detection has to be stepped up, penalties need to be increased, or
both. While this conclusion generally provides an intuitively appealing approach for addressing the tax evasion phenomena, realworld tax compliance and enforcement mechanisms are much

case, there remains only an income effect, which establishes a negative relationship between
the tax rate and evasion. Yitzhaki, supra note 60. In other words, if absolute risk aversion
decreases as income increases, higher tax rates should lead to greater income declarations
and a reduction in evasion. Unfortunately, this result goes against common intuition about
the relationship between the marginal tax rate and evasion according to which an increase
in tax rate provides a greater incentive to evade. It also goes against much of the empirical
evidence indicating a strong positive association between marginal tax rates and evasion. For
surveys of empirical work in this area see Sandmo, supra, at 647 n.8. Similarly, when it comes
to the relationship between actual income and evasion, a higher gross income should increase evasion if individuals are more willing to engage in risky activities as they become
richer and have more money to spare and/or shelter from taxation. Id. at 647. According to
Erling Eide, “[t]he reason why increases in various incomes and gains increases crime is that
punishment in the case of decreasing absolute risk aversion produces a smaller reduction in
expected (total) income. For risk-neutral people an increase in the probability or severity of
punishment and a decrease in the gains to crime will reduce the supply of crime, whereas
changes in exogenous income, and in the remuneration of legal activity have no effect.
Here, changes in the latter income components do not change the bite of punishment.”
Eide, supra note 45, at 350–51. But see id. at 348 (“For the common assumption of decreasing
absolute risk aversion an individual will allocate a larger proportion of his income to tax
cheating the higher his exogenous income and the higher the gains from crime.”).
70.
See Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 330. These two variables are of particular interest for policy purposes since “[t]he former is a parameter over which the tax
authority exercises direct control; [while] the latter it may be assumed to control indirectly
through the amount and efficiency of resources spent on detecting tax evasion.” Id.
71.
Id. at 330. This result supports the gambling analogy where rational gamblers take
fewer risks if the odds are worsened, suggesting that adjustments to either the detection or
punishment parameter can have a restraining impact on evasion. See supra note 66.
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more complex than this analysis suggests.72 Efforts to add the necessary depth and realism to the study of tax compliance have
resulted in the A-S framework being the subject of considerable
research over the past three and a half decades.
Early attempts to add credibility to the A-S analysis are already
evident in the original 1972 article where Allingham and Sandmo
briefly analyze a dynamic case of tax evasion that incorporated an
element of time.73 These efforts continued with later models that
depart from the static framework—in which the taxpayer makes only
one tax report independent from past or future tax filings—and
embrace a more realistic framework whereby the taxpayer makes a
sequence of interdependent tax filings.74 This modification to the
basic A-S model of evasion is necessary because real-life
enforcement decisions are not made in isolation. For instance, once
a taxpayer is discovered to have cheated, the authorities are likely
to investigate her honesty for other periods.75 Similarly, because
income tax reporting is normally an annual event, the taxpayer is
expected to make a decision regarding her present and future reports based on what she has learned from past reporting and
76
auditing experiences.
Another important development in the A-S framework involves
efforts to further endogenize the probability of detection. Allingham and Sandmo originally assumed the probability of detection

72.
See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 324–25 (“This formal representation of the taxpayer’s choice situation is in some ways a significant simplification of his real
world situation; in particular, the present formulation ignores some of the uncertainty elements. [For example,] it abstracts from the fact that the tax laws to some extent leave it to
the discretion of the courts to determine [the type of penalty levied]” and even that the
penalty rate “may itself be uncertain from the point of view of the taxpayer.”); cf. Dick J.
Hessing, Henk Elffers, Henry S. J. Robben & Paul Webley, Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the
Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in Why People
Pay Taxes 291, 291 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (referring to Allingham and Sandmo’s effort to
incorporate risk aversion, reputation, and time into their analysis and stating that “the [A-S]
model is not quite as simple as has sometimes been claimed.”).
73.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 333 (“The purpose . . . is to investigate the
dynamic rather than the comparative static aspects of his declarations: for example whether
for fixed parameters (tax rates, etc.) his declarations will increase or decrease over time,
rather than whether in a fixed period the declaration will increase or decrase [sic] if a parameter is changed.”). For more information on Allingham and Sandmo’s dynamic analysis,
see id. at 332–37.
74.
See, e.g., Eduardo M.R.A. Engel & James R. Hines, Jr., Understanding Tax Evasion Dynamics (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6903, 1999), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/W6903; Joseph Greenberg, Avoiding Tax Avoidance: A (Repeated) GameTheoretic Approach, 32 J. Econ. Theory 1 (1984); Michael Landsberger & Isaac Meilijson,
Incentive Generating State Dependent Penalty System, 19 J. Pub. Econ. 333 (1982).
75.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 333.
76.
Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 824.
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to be exogenous to the taxpayer.77 However, as suggested above,
actual audit probability is not random or fixed and generally depends on the particular characteristics of the taxpayer. To give one
example, in the United States, the IRS develops formulas for selecting returns to audit based on their likelihood to contain
noncompliant items, and it also often focuses on the potential to
maximize enforcement revenue by means of audit adjustments.78
For these reasons, audit rates vary across taxpayers. Returns of
high-income individuals are generally examined more frequently
compared to those with lower incomes, and larger corporations are
79
examined more often than smaller ones.
Based on the relationship evident in real-world enforcement between taxpayers’ income levels and their audit probability,
commentators on the A-S analysis suggested further modifying the
analysis so that the probability of audit will not be fixed but rather
become a dynamic function of reported income and evasion.80
Building on this suggestion, another mode of analysis emerged
that relaxes the unrealistic assumption according to which taxpayers and the tax administration ignore each other’s actions. In the
modified analysis, the model treats the interaction between taxpayers and the tax administration more as a strategic game—where
each party makes the best response to the other’s strategy in light
of available information—than a static gamble.81
77.
Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 331. Note the dissatisfaction that Allingham and Sandmo expressed with respect to this feature of their 1972 analysis (“This may not
be entirely satisfactory, but a natural hypothesis on the nature of the dependence does not
immediately suggest itself.”). Id.
78.
Robert E. Brown & Mark J. Mazur, The National Research Program: Measuring Taxpayer
Compliance Comprehensively, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1255, 1262–64, 1267 (2002).
79.
See, e.g., id. at 1266–67 (discussing the process of case-building); see also Allen Kenney, Everson Touts Increased IRS Enforcement in Fiscal 2004, 105 Tax Notes 1071, 1071 (2004).
80.
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement, 2 J.L. Econ. & Org. 1 (1986);
Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L. Wilde, Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a
Model of Tax Compliance, 27 Int’l Econ. Rev. 739 (1986); Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louis L.
Wilde, Income Tax Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 1 (1985).
81.
In this game, the IRS’ aim is to maximize revenue collected while the taxpayer responds by deciding how much of her income to report. This approach to modeling
compliance results in two basic classes of models according to the timing in which the tax
authority can credibly commit to an audit strategy. In the first group of models, the tax
agency announces and commits to an audit strategy using a cut-off rule before the taxpayers
file their returns. All returns reporting an income below the cut-off point are audited with
probability one, whereas those who report a higher income are not audited at all. In the
second group of models, the tax agency does not commit to an audit strategy prior to the
filing session, but instead decides which taxpayers to audit after all returns have been filed
and based on the information they reveal. This class of models takes the form of a sequential-move game with a number of possible equilibriums. See sources cited supra note 80. For a
useful review of these models, see Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 827–831.
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One final variation of the A-S model worth paying attention to
incorporates labor-supply decisions as endogenous to the tax82
payer’s gross income. This type of model recognizes that “[i]t is
unreasonable to believe that the taxpayer has not thought about
the possibility of evading taxes before he sits down to fill out his
income tax return”83 and that “[m]ore probably, he has thought
about this [matter] before making decisions about the allocation
of his work and leisure hours or about the composition of his investment portfolio.”84 Accordingly, models that incorporate laborsupply decisions look beyond the basic A-S framework which offers
two behavioral responses—evasion or compliance—and consider
that the taxpayer may respond to taxation in other ways. These responses generally include changing work effort, altering
consumption and savings decisions, and choosing legal (compared
to illegal) tax reduction strategies.85 Models in this group usually
focus on how variables such as the tax and wage rates affects the
taxpayer’s responses and the manner in which any one response
affect the others.86 Unfortunately, though this type of model adds
realism to the analysis of tax compliance, incorporating laborsupply considerations makes uncertain the effect of changing the
enforcement variables, thus eliminating the relatively simple computations of the original A-S framework. As a result, “[d]epending
on the taxpayer’s marginal disutility from labor and her risk attitudes, all predictions become possible.”87
In an effort to obtain a more thorough understanding of tax
compliance, researchers continue to develop credible models that,
among other things, examine the role tax practitioners play in
compliance; extend the number of items on which taxpayers report; and also address the possible impact of tax morale, justice,
and fairness considerations on taxpayer behavior.88 Despite these
expansions and others, the focus of the economic analysis of tax
compliance on only two key enforcement measures, punishment
and detection, remains unsatisfactory and not on a par with real82.
See, e.g., John H. Pencavel, A Note on Income Tax Evasion, Labor Supply, and Nonlinear
Tax Schedules, 12 J. Pub. Econ. 115 (1979); Frank A. Cowell, Taxation and Labour Supply with
Risky Activities, 48 Economica 365 (1981).
83.
Sandmo, supra note 69, at 651.
84.
Id.
85.
Slemrod & Yitzhaki, supra note 67, at 1436.
86.
Id.
87.
Franzoni, supra note 4, at 58.
88.
For a few examples, see Andrew D. Cuccia, The Effects of Increased Sanctions on Paid
Preparers: Integrating Economic and Psychological Factors, 16(1) J. of Am. Tax. Assoc. 41 (1994);
Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Role of Moral Sentiments and Audit Perceptions in Tax
Compliance, 49 Pub. Fin./Finances Publiques 70 (Supp. 1994); Steven Klepper & Daniel
Nagin, The Role of Tax Preparers in Tax Compliance, 22 Policy Sciences 167 (1989).
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world enforcement practices or needs. Furthermore, the underlying assumption of the economics of compliance—that every
taxpayer is engaged in some type of rational calculation where she
will conceal income as long as the return on noncompliance is
positive—does not neatly coincide with observed behavior.89 According to survey information, the majority of people consider
themselves to be honest in their tax reporting,90 and presumably
they are, if the estimated noncompliance rate of 16.3 percent is
91
accurate. In fact, it has repeatedly been suggested in the tax compliance literature that “[g]iven the current mild sanctions and low
probability of detection . . . [one] would predict that virtually everyone should be evading tax.”92 In other words, instead of asking
“Why do people evade taxes?” we should be asking “Why do people
93
pay them?”.
The next Part of this Article will explore the strengths and shortcomings of the economics of crime view of compliance,
particularly as it relates to tax enforcement. It will also evaluate the
merits of the query commonly raised on the reasons behind the
observed, high levels of taxpayer compliance. The Article will then
make a case for developing a more comprehensive interpretation
of taxpayer behavior in order to better understand tax compliance
and address noncompliance.
89.
See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact
and Fantasy, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 355, 358 (1985) (“Application of the standard economic theory
of crime to tax avoidance cases . . . produces an unambiguous prediction of behavior:
throughout the 1970s no one should have paid the taxes they owed . . . .”); see also Alfred
Blumstein, Model for Structuring Taxpayer Compliance, in Income Tax Compliance: A Report
of the ABA Section of Taxation, Invitational Conference on Income Tax Compliance 159, 160–61 (1983) (making the point that the penalties for overstating deductions or
failing to report income are too low to deter potential evaders); Jonathan Skinner & Joel
Slemrod, An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion, 38 Nat’l Tax J. 345 (1985); Kent W. Smith
& Karyl A. Kinsey, Understanding Taxpaying Behavior: A Conceptual Framework with Implications
for Research, 21 Law & Soc. Rev. 639 (1987). It is important, however, to distinguish between
different categories of income that, if underreported, are not subject to the same probability
of detection. For example, wage income is typically reported by the employer, and an attempt to underreport it by the taxpayer would, therefore, be detected with high probability.
In that case the economic model predicts that there will be no attempt at evasion, a prediction that is generally supported by available compliance data. See infra note 98 and
accompanying text. Moreover, a taxpayer’s subjective assessment of the probability of audit is
not necessary equal to the actual audit rate. In fact, studies indicate that most people overestimate the probability of detection, and this could go some way toward explaining nonevading behavior. See, e.g., James Alm, Gary H. McClelland & William D. Schulze, Why Do
people Pay Taxes?, 48 J. Pub. Econ. 21 (1992).
90.
Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance (1): A Prestudy
(Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 7, 2001), available at
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/7.pdf.
91.
See The Tax Gap, supra note 7.
92.
Hessing, et al., supra note 72, at 292 (citations omitted).
93.
Id.
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III. An Expanded View of Taxpayer Behavior
A. A Closer Look at Enforcement Strategies:
Deterrence and General Prevention
Empirical and experimental studies tend to support the economic model of compliance to the extent that they generally
identify a negative relationship between the probability and severity of punishment and the rate of crime. In other words, an
increase in either the probability or the severity of punishment can
change the expected utility of noncompliance from positive to
negative, thereby deterring potential offenders and, overall, decreasing the level of crime.94 This effect has also been identified in
the area of tax compliance.95 The correlation between increased
enforcement and compliance appears to be stronger, however,
when the probability of detection is increased than when the punishment is made more severe.96 In either case, enforcement efforts
relying exclusively on punitive strategies do not always alleviate the
problem of noncompliance and, at times, might even worsen the
situation.97
More specifically, tax enforcement findings generally support
the conclusion that taxpayers are highly responsive to perceived or
actual risk of detection in their compliance decisions. According to
IRS estimates, compliance is most likely where the risk of detection
is significant, such as where third-party reporting or withholding
exists. Approximately one percent of all wage, salary, and tip income is misreported, contributing about $10 billion to the tax
gap.98 In contrast, non-farm sole proprietor income, which is subject to little third-party reporting or withholding, has a significantly
94.
See, e.g., Eide, supra note 45, at 355–60 (reviewing empirical studies).
95.
See, e.g., Paul J. Beck, Jon S. Davis & Woonoh Jung, Experimental Evidence on Taxpayer
Reporting Under Uncertainty, 66 Acct. Rev. 535 (1991); Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Evasion and
Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns, 65 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 363 (1983); Nehemiah
Friedland, Shlomo Maital & Aryeh Rutenberg, A Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J.
Pub. Econ. 107 (1978); Ann D. Witte & Diane F. Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax
Administration on Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 Nat’l Tax. J. 1
(1985). These findings are not entirely conclusive. For a review of additional studies and
some contradictory results, see Hessing, et al., supra note 72.
96.
See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 176 (“[A] change in the probability has a greater
effect on the number of offenses than a change in the punishment. . . .”) (citing Lord
Shawness (1965) (“Some judges preoccupy themselves with methods of punishment. This is
their job. But in preventing crime it is of less significance than they like to think. Certainty
of detection is far more important than severity of punishment.”)); see also Dan M. Kahan,
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349, 380 (1997).
97.
See infra text accompanying notes 106–119.
98.
I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-28, supra note 4.
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higher rate of misreporting at approximately 57 percent, which
contributes about $68 billion to the tax gap.99
In terms of the punishment parameter, fines and other types of
penalties also generally improve compliance. However, when it
comes to real-life behavior, minor adjustments in penalty rates are
likely to go unnoticed and so not to affect compliance.100 Some researchers go as far as to argue that heavy penalties do not always
produce better compliance results compared with lighter ones, especially when detection probability is high.101 In certain studies, the
effect of an increase in the severity of punishment is not statistically
significant, and a statistically significant positive effect on criminal
behavior is also occasionally identified.102 Ultimately, penalties generally serve as less of a deterrent for committing crimes than the
probability of detection. Edward Cheng summarizes this point
nicely, reporting that the effect of deterrence tends to decrease
rapidly and nonlinearly with lower probabilities of enforcement,
and tougher punishments are often unable to offset these losses.103
Despite the heightened deterrent effect of detection compared
with punishment, a concern for low-cost tax administration may
lead policymakers to favor raising penalties over increasing costly
detection to improve compliance. In other words, given a fixed
enforcement budget, efforts to maximize deterrence and raise the
most revenue at minimal cost might dictate extreme but rare punishments.104 To this end, one might especially endorse fines and
other monetary sanctions rather than more resource-intensive
105
forms of punishment, such as imprisonment and probation.
99.
Id.; see also Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in
Tax Compliance, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 695 (2007) (stressing the role statutory mechanisms play in
inducing compliant results); Kagan, supra note 29 (finding that compliance with the tax law
is high for items that are most visible such as interest income and salary subject to withholding, but low for items that have little or no “paper trail” such as cash transactions, different
types of business expenses, or charitable contributions).
100. Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 655, 659 (2006).
101. See, e.g., Nehemia Friedland, A Note on Tax Evasion as a Function of the Quality of Information About the Magnitude and Credibility of Threatened Fines: Some Preliminary Research, 12 J.
Applied Soc. Psychol. 54 (1982).
102. Eide, supra note 45, at 358–60 (reviewing literature).
103. Cheng, supra note 100, at 659–60.
104. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 41, at 180–81; see also Sandmo, supra note 69, at 648
(arguing in a different context that in the modeling literature of policy optimization, it is
usually assumed that the collection agency’s objective is to maximize revenue raised).
105. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 38, at 391 (“Fines are preferable to imprisonment and
other types of punishment because they can deter crimes effectively if criminals have sufficient
financial resources . . . . Moreover, fines are more efficient than other methods because the
cost to offenders is also revenue to the state.”). Note that one underlying assumption here
might be that if extreme punishment is effective in creating a deterrence force, there will be
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Unfortunately, however, even when effective in improving compliance, an enforcement strategy of extreme and rare penalties
might still be a poor strategic choice because of the repercussions
that are likely to accompany it. For example, rare and extreme
punishments can provoke community outrage. The idea that the
government doles out just punishment is undermined when extreme sanctions are disproportionably imposed on lesser
offenses.106 And when it comes to serious crimes, inflicting heavy
penalties on the rare few that are caught is arbitrary, draconic, and
highly discriminatory.107 Such an approach could lead to underenforcement as tax administrators become conflicted between their
108
legal obligations and moral judgment. Imposing rare but severe
sanctions may also result in an increase in the severity of crimes
committed as offenders realize that the sanctions imposed will be
extreme regardless of the actual offence committed and attempt to
maximize their gain from crime.109 With extreme consequences for
noncompliance, the possibility of erroneous penalties and the punishment of those who violate the law because of ignorance or
honest mistake also becomes particularly disturbing.
To be sure, taking any form of punitive enforcement to an extreme threatens the democratic nature of society and carries a risk
of inflaming a broader conflict between citizens and the government. Such an approach to tax enforcement might set the tone for
a taxpayer-tax authority relationship that is dominated by feelings
of antagonism and distrust.110 This type of interaction is likely to
“crowd out” whatever intrinsic motivations taxpayers have to com-

no actual need to impose penalties because people will be compliant. This, however, does
not mean that such an approach is politically or socially acceptable, feasible, or credible.
106. See, e.g., Sandmo, supra note 69, at 660 (“[F]or penalties to be socially acceptable,
they probably must be set so that in the eyes of the general public, they ‘fit the crime.’ ”).
107. Cheng, supra note 100, at 660.
108. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 608 (2000).
109. Cowell, supra note 35, at 249–50.
110. See, e.g. Bruno S. Frey, Not Just for the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivations (1997); Bruno S. Frey, A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues,
107 Econ. J. 1043 (1997); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law & Pol’y 102
(2007); see also Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Evasion in Switzerland: The Role of Deterrence
and Tax Morale (Ctr. For Res. in Econ., Mgmt. & Arts, Working Paper No. 2006-13, 2006),
available at http://www.crema-research.ch/papers/2006-13.pdf; Bruno S. Frey & Lars P.
Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis (CESifo, Working Paper No. 760,
2002) [hereinafter Frey & Feld, 2002 Working Paper], available at http://www.cesifogroup.de/~DocCIDL/760.pdf.
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ply with their tax obligations and might also lead them to actively
resist paying their taxes, either legally or illegally.111
From an economic perspective, even when an increase in enforcement is feasible, conducive to democratic values, and results
in an increase in compliance, it might still be suboptimal to raise
these efforts to the maximum.112 Enforcement expenditures represent a real cost to the economy, while the revenue collected can be
113
viewed as a mere transfer from the private to the public sector.
Furthermore, increased enforcement of the tax system can also
have disincentive effects similar to an increase in tax rates and base
and should therefore be handled with caution and restraint.114 Finally, in addition to the considerations that counsel against
111. See, e.g., Frey & Feld, 2002 Working Paper, supra note 110 (analyzing 1970–1995 tax
compliance data from 26 Swiss cantons and finding that taxpayers respond in a systematic
way to how the tax authority treats them. In particular, taxpayers’ willingness to pay their
taxes, or their tax morale, is supported, or even raised, when tax officials treat them with
respect. In contrast, an emphasis on authoritarian means to force taxpayers pay their dues
generally leads to a distrust of citizens and a crowding out of tax morale, translating to lower
levels of tax compliance); see also Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated, 3 Economics of Governance 87 (2002). In this context, noncompliance is
particularly likely when taxpayers view the use of threat and legal authority to be illegitimate
or unreasonable. This may involve administrative disrespect for taxpayers or an arbitrary
refusal to take their concerns into account in the enforcement process. See e.g., Eugene
Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness (1982); see also Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26; E. Allan Lind & Tom R.
Tyler, The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988); Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (1990); Robert A. Kagan & John T. Scholz, The Criminology of Corporation
and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies, in Enforcing Regulation 67 (Keith Hawkins & John
M. Thomas eds., 1984). Several authors have written on the possibility of harmful effects of
punitive enforcement in tax more generally. See, e.g., Valerie Braithwaite & John Braithwaite,
An Evolving Compliance Model for Tax Enforcement, in Crimes of Privilege: Readings in
White-Collar Crime 405, 406 (Neal Shover & John Paul Wright eds., 2001) (“Tax enforcement is an area where the effects of deterrence and compliance approaches are
unknown. When taxpayers are audited, for example, and a penalty is imposed, it is unclear
whether they learn that they got away with a lot of things that the audit did not detect . . . .
Sometimes an audit succeeds in deterring cheating in the long run, but in the year or two
after audit taxpayers believe they are unlikely to be audited, and this has a dramatic negative
effect on compliance in those two years.” (internal citation omitted)); Carroll, supra note 9,
at 234 (“[A]udits, withholding, and reporting requirements, and ‘Big Brother’ data files that
cross-check taxpayers with reports of income sources, charities, utility companies, and so
forth seem necessary to increase the risk of detection. However, such tactics may only create
a larger under-ground economy and less visible ways to cheat.”); Karyl A. Kinsey, Theories and
Models of Tax Cheating, in 18 Crim. Just. Abstracts 402, 416 (1986) (arguing that deterrence-based tools like tax audits frequently backfire by teaching tax cheaters how much is
being overlooked by the tax administration).
112. In this context, raising enforcement to the maximum means increasing enforcement until one dollar spent yields one dollar in revenue.
113. Slemrod, supra note 10, at 1–2.
114. Id.; cf. Franzoni, supra note 4, at 62 (suggesting that it is not obvious that curbing
or eliminating evasion is necessarily a desirable goal since such efforts might be economically unsound in potentially shutting down beneficial economic activities that cannot bear
the cost of taxation).
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extreme enforcement, empirical evidence suggests that even such
moderate means may fail to effectively promote compliance. When
researchers tested the rate and probability of punishment at moderate levels, consistent with those observed in actual tax
115
enforcement, they found the deterrent effects to be quite small.
Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that a broad enforcement
approach, where detection and punishment become complementary strategies, rather than extreme substitutions, and more
importantly, where nonpunitive enforcement mechanisms are also
considered, might be a superior alternative to relying only on authoritarian deterrence. In fact, enforcement efforts that rely
exclusively on punitive measures and the severity and probability of
punishment are likely to be short-sighted at best and counterproductive at worst. Taxpayers adapt, take up new strategies of
noncompliance, and become increasingly sophisticated in their
risk assessment of being caught and penalized for wrongdoing.116
In an area as complex and controversial as tax, legalistic and authoritarian attempts at shaping behavior lead to a never-ending
process, as efforts to address one type of undesirable behavior
117
leave countless others unattended. A broader, more constructive
and forward looking definition of deterrence than the one
adopted by the traditional economic analysis of tax compliance
ought to look beyond the use of threat and legal authority. It
should encompass other factors and mechanisms that offer a preventive force against crime.
The literature of crime has generally interpreted preventative
measures as a way to take into consideration the external conditions
that affect law-abiding norms and morals in addition to the direct
monetary costs and benefits attached to compliant and noncompliant choices.118 Read in this light, an expansive characterization of
115. James Alm, Betty Jackson & Michael McKee, Deterrence and Beyond: Toward a Kinder,
Gentler IRS, in Why People Pay Taxes 311, 322–23 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992).
116. Carroll, supra note 9, at 258 (indicating that evidence of people’s behavioral adaptations to undermine increased enforcement is available in a wide range of regulatory areas,
including with respect to shoplifting, drunk driving, and family violence). But see Cheng,
supra note 100, at 668 (“[W]hen searching for solutions to undesirable conduct, legislatures
naturally incline toward establishing new rules that prohibit and punish the conduct. The
machinery—police, prosecutors, courts, prisons—is already in place; the legislature might as
well use it.”).
117. Doreen McBarnet, When Compliance is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes
in Law to Changes in Attitude, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and
Evasion 229 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Valerie Braithwaite, Dancing with Tax Authorities:
Motivational Postures and Non-compliant Actions, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax
Avoidance and Evasion 15, 15 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003). See generally Braithwaite &
Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 406–07.
118. Eide, supra note 45, at 353.
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deterrence would seek to improve tax compliance not only by
means of adversely curbing illegal activity but also by constructively
fostering legal behavior, such as by balancing punitive deterrence
with education, encouragement and assistance so as to facilitate a
broad base for taxpayer compliance. A familiar practice in regulatory programs generally, this balanced approach is considered a
particularly appropriate technique in complex areas like taxation.
In these areas where compliance is notoriously difficult and not
always in the short-term self-interest of the regulated, the very classification and detection of noncompliance become challenging as
well.119
B. The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Behavior
“Common sense and everyday observations tell us that people refrain
from tax evasion—as well as from speeding, shoplifting, and polluting the environment—not only from their estimates of the expected
penalty, but for reasons that have to do with social and moral consid120
erations.”
Human behavior is multifaceted and it is influenced by many
factors. In the context of taxation, taxpayers’ disposition toward
public institutions, ethics, morals and norms, as well as the perceived fairness of the tax system are all highly instrumental in
121
shaping behavior. Moreover, enforcement policies themselves are
more complex than mere combinations of penalties and audit
119. Kent W. Smith, Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance, in Why
People Pay Taxes 223, 223 (Joel Slemrod, ed., 1992) (stating that deterrence based on the
detection and punishment of offenses is only one aspect of most enforcement and regulatory programs and that a mix of strategies has been found in several studies of regulatory
agencies and the police).
120. Sandmo, supra note 69, at 649–50.
121. Some academics suggest, for example, that taxpayers may not process personal
consequences, but, instead, focus on doing the “right thing”—determined from legal,
moral, social, utilitarian, or personal consequence viewpoints—leading to a “normprocessing” rather than an “outcome-processing” model of decision making. See, e.g., John S.
Carroll, How Taxpayers Think about Their Taxes: Frames and Values, in Why People Pay Taxes
43, 47 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Benno Torgler, Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis (2007) (developing the concept of tax
morale as an inherent affinity of taxpayers to comply with their tax obligation and exploring
a broad range of parameters affecting this affinity); 2 Taxpayer Compliance (Jeffrey A.
Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989) (examining social science perspectives and influences
related to taxpayer compliance); Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions,
34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 274, 281–82 (1967) (finding that taxpayer compliance and, particularly,
the reaction taxpayers have to different enforcement mechanisms depends, to some extent,
on these taxpayers’ socio-economic characteristics).
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probabilities. Institutional and procedural factors, such as tax administrators, tax courts, and tax advisors, as well as the manner in
which these bodies interact with the taxpayer community, affect tax
compliance.122 The standard economic analysis tends to shy away
from accounting for the effect these various determinants have on
compliance. Increasingly, however, scholars have begun collecting
empirical evidence on the role nonmonetary parameters play in
shaping taxpaying behavior generally, and improving tax compliance and constraining noncompliance in particular. At the same
time, there have been growing attempts to incorporate these parameters into the more formal economic analysis.
The traditional economic literature on tax compliance examines
taxpayer behavior through the decisions of a single individual.123
Set in this way, the analysis falls short of putting the issue of tax
compliance in its broader societal setting and, consequently, misses
important explanatory opportunities. One example of this oversight is the limited range of goods examined in the standard
analysis, which tends to portray individuals as concerned only with
their private consumption while displaying total disregard for public goods and services.124 Evidence, however, shows that taxpayer
behavior depends not only on private consumption capacity but
also on what taxpayers believe they obtain from public goods and
services. Taxpayers expect to receive some return on the taxes they
pay, and, not only do they care about these returns, but they also
evaluate whether the tradeoff is equitable compared to what other
taxpayers appear to receive.125 Alm et al., for example, find greater
willingness to comply with the tax law among taxpayers who believe
they benefit from public goods.126 Spicer and Becker find that individuals who are told their taxes are heavier than others evade by
122. For example, when taxpayers are asked to justify their tax evasion, they commonly
respond by saying that they have been treated unfairly by the tax system. Although this answer can be regarded as a mere defense of one’s own self-interested behavior, it may also
indicate that taxpayers take into account institutional and environmental factors that go
beyond the probability and severity of punishment. See Sandmo, supra note 69, at 651; see also
Alm et al., supra note 115, at 313 (“[D]etection and punishment cannot explain the compliance behavior of all individuals. The percentage of tax returns that are subject to detailed
audit is quite small in most countries, and penalties are seldom more than a fraction of
unpaid taxes. . . . However, compliance in many counties remains relatively high. Additional
factors must play a role—perhaps a dominant one—in tax compliance.” (footnote omitted)); supra note 89 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
124. Cowell, supra note 35, at 240.
125. In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that perceptions of individual incomes
may play less of a role than perceptions of fairness and social outcomes associated with the
tax law. See, e.g., Steenbergen et al., supra note 39.
126. James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data, 45 Nat’l Tax J. 107 (1992).
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relatively high amounts, while those who are told their taxes are
lower than others evade by relatively small amounts.127
One study that compared the impact various information
sources have on taxpayers found that social influence and, specifically, perceived attitudes toward noncompliance of those people
with whom taxpayers discuss taxes have the strongest impact on
these taxpayers’ commitment to comply with their tax obligations.128 That is, taxpayers’ commitment to paying taxes is affected
not only by what taxpayers believe they receive for paying taxes and
by their relative gain or loss in consumption compared to that of
others, but it may mostly be impacted by social interaction and the
extent to which noncompliance is perceived to be prevalent in the
taxpayers’ social environment. When taxpayers believe that people
around them generally cheat, they are more likely to cheat themselves, and when taxpayers believe others are usually honest, they are
more willing to pay their own taxes honestly.129 It becomes clear,
therefore, that taxpaying behavior is not only the result of isolated
calculations of the immediate monetary costs and benefits taxpayers
expect to incur from compliance as opposed to noncompliance.
Taxpaying behavior is also a collective process where information,
experiences, attitudes, and patterns of behavior are shared among
taxpayers, impacting their assessments of costs and benefits and,
consequently, their compliance with the tax law.
Some scholars go as far as to argue that moral, ethical, and societal factors play a role in compliance that may be more important

127. Michael W. Spicer & Lee A. Becker, Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental
Approach, 33 Nat’l Tax J. 171 (1980). Even though there is evidence that perceived inequalities in the tax system are related to noncompliance, the evidence is not entirely
conclusive. For example, Paul Webley et al., Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach
(1991), reached an opposite conclusion from Spicer and Becker. However, Robert Mason &
Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 Nat’l Tax J. 489 (1984), found
that dissatisfaction with the tax system is not directly related to reported noncompliance but
that it changes other attitudes and beliefs that may impact compliance. For further analysis
of these findings see Cowell, supra note 9, at 219–20; Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 851.
128. John T. Scholz, Kathleen M. McGraw & Marco R. Steenbergen, Will Taxpayers Ever
Like Taxes: Responses to the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, 13 J. Econ. Psychol. 625 (1992); see
also Steenbergen et al., supra note 39.
129. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 128; see also Cowell, supra note 9, at 101–24; John
T. Scholz, Trust, Taxes, and Compliance, in Trust and Governance 135 (Valerie Braithwaite
& Margaret Levi eds., 1998). When taxpayers see that others disregard statutory taxes, creating an unjust disparity in the allocation of the tax burden or leading to a reduction in the
quality or quantity of public goods and services, they may rationalize resisting payment of
their own taxes. Andreoni et al., supra note 12, at 851; cf. Robert H. Frank, Choosing the
Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (1985) (discussing the role of
relative standing as key in shaping individuals’ perceptions of well-being and, consequently,
the actions they take).
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than the threat of legal punishment.130 Grasmick and Scott find, for
example, that, while the relationship between the threat of legal
punishment and intention to evade taxes is statistically significant,
anticipated feelings of guilt and social stigma attached to tax eva131
sion are more strongly associated with deterrence. Similarly,
Mason and Mason argue that an appeal to taxpayer conscience or
civic virtue can improve tax compliance more than the threat of
legal sanctions.132 Other scholars, such as Blumental et al., Leandra
Lederman, and Alex Raskolnikov, clarify that detection and punishment could be complementary strategies to moral, ethical, and
social appeals, especially when they are applied to different groups
of taxpayers.133
Notwithstanding the issue of how much weight to assign to various enforcement considerations, the mere incorporation of
nonmonetary parameters and influencers into the traditional economic analysis of tax compliance often results in a better
description of real-world taxpaying behavior than a theory built
only on selfish monetary assumptions.134 Staying within the economic paradigm, the rationality proposition no longer implies
narrow materialism or pure self-interest. Instead, rationality now
reflects the reality that most taxpayers are constrained by a range
of considerations and that these considerations lead them to obey
the tax law when the sum of all potential costs of noncompliance,

130. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. Rev. 333 (2001);
see also Steenbergen et al., supra note 39, at 32 (concluding that perceptions of individual
outcomes played less of a role than perceptions of individual fairness and social outcomes
associated with the 1986 Tax Reform Act).
131. Harold G. Grasmick & Wilbur J. Scott, Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control:
A Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft, 2 J. Econ. Psychol. 213 (1982) (suggesting that
policies increasing the sense of moral duty to obey the law among taxpayers may significantly improve compliance).
132. Laurie Mason & Robert Mason, A Moral Appeal for Taxpayer Compliance: The Case for
a Mass Media Campaign, 14 Law & Pol’y 381, 394 (1992).
133. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian & Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect
Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 54 Nat’l Tax J. 125 (2001);
Joel Slemrod, Marsha Blumenthal & Charles Christian, Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 455 (2001);
Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 Ohio
St. L.J. 1453 (2003); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1181 (2008); see also Kristina Murphy & Karen Byng, Preliminary Findings from The
Australian Tax System Survey of Tax Scheme Investors (Ctr. For Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l
Univ., Working Paper No. 40, 2002), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/
WP/40.pdf.
134. Note, for example, the incorporation of reputation already in the A-S analysis. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 36, at 332–37; see also, e.g., Erard & Feinstein, supra note 88
(adding guilt and shame into the analysis of evasion).
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including likely moral, ethical, and social sanctions, outweigh the
expected gain.135
In sum, although the standard economic approach to compliance
serves as a useful starting point for understanding taxpayer behavior,
the overly narrow focus of this framework restricts its utility. Ultimately, this approach might lead policymakers to reach misguided
conclusions that require enforcement that is too punitive such that
it becomes politically unsound and counterproductive in its effect
on compliance. Fortunately, as the above discussion reveals, realworld tax administration does not implement effective levels of deterrence and yet compliance rates remain generally high. This
suggests that when it comes to the behavior of the taxpayer, motives
other than the desire to maximize one’s net income must be considered. Extending the analysis of tax compliance to consider such
additional motives requires developing a better understanding of
the many influencers on taxpayer behavior and the manner in
which enforcement policy can properly and effectively address
them. Researchers and administrators in Australia have been involved in this particular line of investigation during the past
decade, with results that bear important implications for the enforcement of tax compliance in Australia, as well as in other
industrialized countries and regulatory areas.
The next Part will review the research in motivations and, particularly, those motivational influencers identified to be most
commonly associated with taxpaying behavior. The Article will then
introduce the concept of responsive regulation and explore the
manner in which this approach to regulation brings key elements
of enforcement together to foster tax compliance.

135. Cf. Becker, supra note 38, at 385–86 (“[T]he economic approach I refer to does
not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material gain. It is a method
of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations. Along with others, I have tried
to pry economists away from narrow assumptions about self-interest. Behavior is driven by a
much richer set of values and preferences. The analysis assumes that individuals maximize
welfare as they conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic.”).
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IV. The Australian Approach to Tax Enforcement
A. Motivational Postures: Attitudes, Behavior,
and Service Delivery
“Regulating people through understanding the simultaneous emergence and retreat of various postures means that at the most
fundamental level, regulation rests on the art of managing relationships.” 136
Innovative research in regulation has identified a group of motivational influencers, best known today as “motivational postures,”
that capture the way regulated entities position and think about
137
themselves in relation to the regulatory authority. The basic principle behind the concept of motivational postures is that the
beliefs, values, and attitudes of regulated actors lead them to adopt
a particular posture (or stance) toward the regulator.138 In the context of compliance with tax law, motivational postures capture the
manner in which taxpayers see themselves as they relate to the tax
system and its administration and, particularly, the amount of social distance they wish to place between themselves and these
functions.139 This distance indicates the taxpayers’ degree of accep136. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 21.
137. See Valerie Braithwaite, Games of Engagement: Postures within the Regulatory Community,
17 Law & Pol’y 225 (1995); Valerie Braithwaite, John Braithwaite, Diane Gibson & Toni
Makkai, Regulatory Styles, Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance, 16 Law & Pol’y
363 (1994). People possess many beliefs, values, and attitudes that are often multidimensional, difficult to identify, and may appear to be inherently contradictory, especially
when they translate to behavior. When it comes to strategic planning of enforcement, what
researchers found to be helpful in understanding and determining the motivational influencers for taxpaying behavior was looking at motivations not in the abstract but in relation
to adherence to the regulatory authority. See Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note
27, at 22–24, app.1 at 61–62 (1998); Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 24 (“Motivational postures are proving to be useful markers of degree of consent, cooperation and commitment
that underlies the human system as it comes into contact with the administrative/technical
tax system.”).
138. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 17–18 (explaining that individuals and groups regularly evaluate authorities in terms of what they stand for and how they perform). Over time,
beliefs and attitudes for the authority are developed; they are socially shared and challenged. Individuals then develop rationalizations for their feelings and use values and
ideologies to justify the motivational posture they possess. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra
note 111, at 410 (“Motives shape the values and attitudes we publicly espouse to defend our
position to ourselves and others. We all approach regulators with our own world view of how
we want to and ought to engage with the regulatory system.” (internal citation omitted)).
139. Bogardus uses the term “social distance” to refer to the degree to which individuals
or groups have positive feelings toward other ethnic groups and attribute status to them.
Emory S. Bogardus, Immigration and Race Attitudes (1928). The contemporary work
in motivational postures, however, examines the concept of social distance in the context of
the regulator-regulated relationship. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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tance or rejection of the tax authority and, accordingly, the extent
to which these taxpayers are open to the authority’s influence.140
Strategies for inducing compliance are likely to vary in their effectiveness depending on the motivational posture of the targeted
taxpayers. In other words, different regulatory and enforcement
measures can be successful when dealing with taxpayers who see
themselves as law-abiding citizens versus those taxpayers who see
themselves as opportunistic. Moreover, taxpayers who feel the tax
administration has insulted or treated them disrespectfully may
respond differently to particular enforcement mechanisms than
taxpayers who feel that the tax authority has treated them with dignity and that it acts with integrity and legitimacy.141 For this reason,
tax administrations that seek to understand the taxpayers’ full
range of motivational influencers may be better situated to effectively target and encourage taxpayers to “do the right thing” and
comply with their tax obligations, while at the same time retaining
the capacity to monitor and constrain those motivations that might
lead taxpayers down the path of noncompliance.142
Five key motivational postures have been identified as relevant
to the realm of tax compliance. These are: (1) commitment,
(2) capitulation, (3) resistance, (4) disengagement, and (5) game
playing.143 The first two postures, commitment and capitulation,
are compliant in nature, the former more than the latter. They
suggest the taxpayers’ cooperative interaction with and acceptance
of the tax system and authority.144 The latter three postures,
140. Motivational postures can be viewed as indicators for the degree to which the taxpayer identifies herself to be a full participant in the tax system and her resulted
susceptibility to the influence of its administration. This will reflect on the taxpayer inclination to not only comply with existing rules and regulations but also cooperate once these are
reformed. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18; see also Valerie Braithwaite & Jenny Job, The
Theoretical Base for the ATO Compliance Model 1, 10 (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l
Univ., Research Note 5, 2004), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/RN5.pdf.
141. See, e.g., Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, app.1 at 61–62; Michael
Wenzel, The Multiplicity of Taxpayer Identities and Their Implications for Tax Ethics, 29 Law &
Pol’y 31 (2007); cf. Carroll, supra note 121, at 48.
142. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 23, app.1 at 62.
143. Id. at 22–24 (discussing the first four postures). For complementary reviews, see
Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18; Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 410–11. See
generally supra note 137 and infra note 145. For variations of the Australian model, note that
in New Zealand, for example, the tax administration adopted a compliance model similar to
the Australian one but featuring only four postures. In the New Zealand model, gameplaying was taken to be a potential subcategory within each of the other four postures. See
Tony Morris & Michele Lonsdale, Translating the Compliance Model into Practical Reality, in
2004 Proceedings of the Internal Revenue Serv. Research Conference 57, 61–62
(2005).
144. Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 1, 3 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Cash
Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 21.
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resistance, disengagement, and game playing, represent
increasingly defiant states of mind with the taxpayers’ growing
distance and dislike toward the tax authority, the system of
taxation, and what taxpayers perceive they stand for.145
When commitment and capitulation are high, the tax administration is more likely to gain compliance from taxpayers. The
posture of commitment expresses the taxpayers’ understanding
that the tax administration is a necessary institution for democracy
and suggests a feeling of moral obligation to advance the common
good and voluntarily pay due taxes.146 Capitulation reflects acceptance of the tax authority and its officials as legitimate and the belief
that they are positively responsive to taxpayers as long as taxpayers
behave according to the law and obey the authorities.147 However,
when the defiant postures of resistance, disengagement, and game
playing are dominant, things are rather different. As Valerie
Braithwaite, a leading scholar in the research in motivational
postures, explains: defiant postures are likely to coincide with feelings of being threatened by the tax system or administration, low
satisfaction with democracy, anti-government and pro-market attitudes, relatively weak identification with being a citizen and an
honest taxpayer, higher than average investment in aggressive tax
planning, and a desire to abolish the tax system.148 Taxpayers who
hold defiant postures are consequently more likely to be unaf-

145. See, e.g. Braithwaite, supra note 144, at 3–4; Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra
note 144. Taxpayers usually have a basic “comfort zone” that reflects their general stance
toward the tax administration and the law. However, motivational postures are the result of a
dynamic interaction between the taxpayer and the administration. Accordingly, the taxpayer
can demonstrate more than one posture in any specific encounter, and she may also vary
her attitude depending on the nature of a given interaction. There is some compatibility
among the postures. Commitment and capitulation are generally compatible so that where
they exist, disengagement and resistance are unlikely to be present. Disengagement is more
compatible with resistance and game playing. According to Valerie Braithwaite, none of
these correlations, however, is sufficiently high to conclude that taxpayers can be placed on
a simple adversarial-cooperative dimension. See Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 22–24; see also
Valerie Braithwaite, The Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey: Goals and Measures (Ctr.
for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 2, 2001), available at
http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/2.pdf; Valerie Braithwaite, Monika Reinhart, Malcolm Mearns & Rachelle Graham, Preliminary Findings from the Community Hopes, Fears and
Actions Survey (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 3, 2001),
available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/WP/3.pdf; Valerie Braithwaite, Kristina
Murphy & Monika Reinhart, Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation,
29 Law & Policy 137 (2007).
146. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411.
147. Id.
148. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 24.
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fected by persuasion, or by the traditional punitive measures of being caught and punished for noncompliance.149
Resistance, the first defiant posture, reflects the taxpayers’ distrust over the tax authority’s commitment to cooperate with and be
respectful of them.150 These taxpayers may be watchful and feel the
need to fight for their rights or otherwise curb the power of the tax
administration.151 Disengagement is a more extreme attitude that
stems from the taxpayers’ deep disenchantment with the tax system
152
and its administration. The main objective of disengaged taxpayers becomes withdrawal from any interaction with the tax
153
administration rather than challenge its authority. By mentally
positioning themselves outside the regulatory reach, the disengaged can further that end and cut themselves off from attempts of
persuasion and influence. This makes it extremely difficult for the
tax administration to gain compliance.154
The final defiant posture is game-playing. With a game-playing
posture, taxpayers view the law as something to respect or ignore
depending on which approach better advances their self-interest.155
Unlike disengagement, game-playing remains bounded within the
regulatory realm. However, rather than comply with the spirit of the
law, players use the letter of the law to de facto undermine its
intent.156 The existing literature suggests that traditionally, elite
157
groups have most commonly practiced this posture. However, as
149. Id. (explaining that persuasion measures may include, for example, education and
open dialogue).
150. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411.
151. Id.
152. Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 10–11.
153. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18.
154. Existing research indicates that disengagement is generally the posture most difficult for authorities to manage. See e.g., Braithwaite et al., supra note 137, at 383–84; see also
Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 11 (making the point that when the taxpayer cuts herself off from the authority, the only regulatory option left to the authority is to make
noncompliance impossible).
155. McBarnet, supra note 117, at 229–33. The game playing posture emerged from discussions with tax officials and taxpayers over matters of compliance. Although this type of
behavior has been previously studied in the context of economic regulation, it has yet to be
extensively examined in other regulatory contexts, especially by social scientists. See Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 18–19; Valerie Braithwaite, Monika Reinhart & Jason McCrae, Game
Playing with Tax Law (Ctr. for Tax Sys. Integrity, Austl. Nat’l Univ., Research Note 8, 2004),
available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/publications/RN8.pdf.
156. McBarnet, supra note 117, at 229–33. With “disengagement and game playing,”
“[c]itizens see the power of government as irrelevant to their lives. The choice is whether
they acknowledge the authority or step outside its reach.” Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140,
at 10.
157. Thirteen percent of the recipients of the 2000 national survey conducted by the
Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University were identified as game
players. On the other hand, approximately ninety-two percent of the survey respondents
indicated the posture of commitment and seventy-three percent recognized the posture of
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aggressive tax avoidance strategies become increasingly available to,
and acceptable by, the general public, the game-playing mindset is
likely to spread and become a more serious problem for
enforcement.158
The more committed people are to paying taxes, the less likely
they are to put effort into tax minimization strategies. The postures
most strongly associated with aggressive forms of tax avoidance are
game-playing and resistance, while evasion is a more likely option
for those who are resistant or disengaged.159 However, being committed or capitulated does not necessarily prevent taxpayers from
misconduct. Behavior is the result of a variety of inputs, only some
of which are related to beliefs and attitudes, and so, consistency
between mental states and behavior should not automatically be
assumed.160 The tax administration must acknowledge the disparity
capitulation in themselves. Fifty-five percent of the respondents reported holding a resistance posture. Least pervasive was disengagement with only seven percent of respondents
identifying themselves that way. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 23, and 19–24 more generally
(providing a brief analysis of the 2000 Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey).
158. See, e.g., Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 406–07 (“Increasingly, the
problem for large business firms is not tax evasion, but adoption of sophisticated strategies
for circumventing tax laws . . . . [W]hat is true for the largest corporations is also true for the
wealthiest individuals.”). Braithwaite & Braithwaite report that the accounting firms in the
United States once known as the “Big Five” have been able to increase their profits substantially through offering their clients more aggressive tax minimization strategies. They
indicate, for example, that Ernst & Young and Deloitte & Touche reported a 29 percent
jump in their profits from tax service in the United States in 1997 and, overall, between
1993 and early 2000, tax revenue for the Big Five has grown at twice the pace of audit revenue. The worry with these expansions is that they will trigger a race to the bottom where
other players will assume that adopting aggressive tax practices is the only way to stay competitive. Id.; see also Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 11 (arguing that “[t]he public
response of dissociation [of taxpayer from the tax authority and their tax obligations] has
the potential for posing a major threat to the regulatory effectiveness of tax authorities, and
more broadly democratic governance.”). The game playing posture is a reminder that compliance itself could become a problem when it is defined as compliance with rules as written.
Doreen McBarnet suggests that in the context of taxation the goal for enforcement ought to
be securing long-term compliance with the intent—rather than with the black letter—of the
law. Doreen McBarnet, The Construction of Compliance and the Challenge for Control: The Limits of
Noncompliance Research, in Why People Pay Taxes 333 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992); see also Kristina Murphy, Regulating More Effectively: The Relationship Between Procedural Justice, Legitimacy,
and Tax Non-compliance, 32 J.L. & Soc’y 562, 564 (2005).
159. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 33 (discussing the findings from the Australian 2000
Community Hopes, Fears and Actions Survey); cf. Paul Webley et al., supra note 127 (finding
that taxpayers who indicate alienation from or negative attitudes toward laws and the government are considerably more likely to engage in evasion). For a discussion on the
relationship between attitudes and behavior more generally, see infra notes 161–164 and
accompanying text.
160. Braithwaite, supra note 117, at 35 (“All too often, authorities make the assumption
of consistency between attitude and behavior: People who do the wrong thing are bound to
be nasty pieces of work, and need to be treated like the villains they are.”). In fact, empirical
evidence indicates that the relationship between motivational postures and behavior is empirically weak in that motivational postures do not, necessarily, lead to acts of obedience or
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between motivational postures and taxpayer behavior and be cognizant and responsive to both in order to promote compliance.
Crucially, the administration does not only serve as a passive observer of the behavior and attitudes of taxpayers, but it also affects
them considerably.
It is well understood today that the perceptions taxpayers have
of the procedural justice of the tax system—how the tax administration treats them and other similarly situated taxpayers—affect
the legitimacy these taxpayers attribute to the administration and
the extent to which they accept its authority.161 This, in turn, impacts the taxpayers’ levels of compliance. Taxpayers who believe
that the tax administration and its officials make an effort to be fair
and respectful are more likely than those with more negative perceptions to assign greater legitimacy to the tax system, align with its
administration, and, consequently, comply with their tax obligations.162 Further, positive behavior by the tax administration
increases the likelihood of compliance because of the tendency for
people to react in a like manner to behavior they experience from
others.163 In accordance with this rule of reciprocity, helpful and
disobedience. Disparities between the motivational postures taxpayers hold and the compliance-related actions they take are also likely to reflect environmental conditions such as
reference groups and the nature of the interaction between taxpayers and the tax administration. Id. at 16–17, 33 (commenting that inconsistencies between postures and behavior
goes against the expectation that attitudes and behavior be related and consistent and that
such an expectation implies rationality, comprehension, and thought that are not always
present in human behavior. In fact, the conceptualization of attitudes and behavior as distinct is in keeping with empirical findings in the area of tax enforcement as well as the
broader realm of human behavior).
161. See, e.g., Lind & Tyler, supra note 111; Tyler, supra note 111; Tom R. Tyler &
Kathleen M. McGraw, Ideology and the Interpretation of Personal Experience: Procedural Justice and
Political Quiescence, 42 J. Soc. Issues 115 (1986); Tom R. Tyler, Justice, Self-Interest, and the
Legitimacy of Legal and Political Authority, in Beyond Self-Interest 171, 171 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990).
162. See Tyler, supra note 111 (for the general relation between perceptions of procedural justice, legitimacy and obedience to the law). For taxpayer behavior, see Cowell,
supra note 9 (reviewing the attitudinal and experimental literatures and finding that individual attitudes and perceptions of the tax system are generally related to compliant
behavior); Murphy & Byng, supra note 133; Kristina Murphy, Turning Resistance into Compliance: Evidence from a Longitudinal Study of Tax Scheme Investors (Ctr. For Tax Sys. Integrity,
Austl. Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 77, 2005), available at http://ctsi.anu.edu.au/
publications/WP/77.pdf (analyzing 2002 and 2004 survey data in the case of Australian
taxpayers who were caught investing in mass marketed tax schemes in the late 1990s. According to the analysis, tax scheme investors who were more likely to think the 2002
settlement offer extended by the Australian Tax Office was fair were less likely to hold onto
resistant views toward the ATO and more likely to be compliant with their tax obligations in
2004).
163. Smith, supra note 119, at 225 (citations omitted); see also Cash Economy Task
Force 1998, supra note 27, app.1 at 62 (indicating that, ideally, if the tax authority treats the
taxpayer with fairness and respect, the taxpayer will try to comply because it is “the right
thing to do.”).
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respectful service may also coax a broader normative commitment
of compliance among taxpayers when they believe that the tax administration acts positively toward them as a matter of general
practice.164
The result of taxpayer/tax-authority interaction may be different, however, for taxpayers who do not trust or respect the tax
authority or for those who feel deeply threatened by it.165 When
taxpayers feel uneasy with the tax authority, such as when they anticipate or experience a particularly unpleasant interaction with tax
officials, these taxpayers might adopt coping mechanisms to pro166
tect themselves against the tax administration’s disapproval.
These coping mechanisms often boil down to an acute sense of
polarization, where taxpayers interpret differences with the tax system and its administration as conflicts between “us” and “them.”167
At this point, a friction, or rift, is likely to emerge between taxpayers and the tax system and its administration.168 When the tax
administration employs punitive strategies that communicate disapproval, this friction is expected to amplify with the rise in
perceived disapproval, exacerbating feelings of animosity and defi169
ance. One key challenge for tax officials in this situation is to
change the motivational postures taxpayers hold. Tax officials may
be able do this by offering cooperation, positive and helpful ser-

164. Smith, supra note 119, at 227; Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 Law &
Pol’y 102 (2007). For a good discussion of the role that administrative practices play in
affecting taxpayer compliance, see Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS,
51 Kan. L. Rev. 971 (2003).
165. Taxpayer distrust or hostility toward the tax administration could be the result of
experiences taxpayers have directly with the tax administration or due to other, indirect
interactions, such as what taxpayers observe from the experiences of others or based on
norms and habits of a reference group. Direct contact with the tax administration can be
gained, for example, while the taxpayer is being audited and resenting the intrusive treatment, or even from the failure to be audited when such failure is viewed as a weakness on
the part of the administration. Note, for example, that there is evidence to suggest that personal experience with audits might increase tax resistance. M. W. Spicer & S. B. Lundstedt,
Understanding Tax Evasion, 31 Pub. Fin./Finances Publiques 295 (1976).
166. Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 8, 11.
167. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411–12 (advancing the argument that
the way to understand the interaction between the taxpayer and the tax administration as
well as the taxpayer need for a coping mechanism in certain circumstances is through theories of shame and identity); see also Eliza Ahmed & Valerie Braithwaite, A Need for Emotionally
Intelligent Policy: Linking Tax Evasion with Higher Education Funding, 10 Legal & Criminological Psychol. 1 (2005). For a useful review of some of the theories relevant to the
regulator-regulated relationship, in a different context, see John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation 79–90 (2002).
168. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 411.
169. Id. at 412.

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art64

36

Leviner:
Leviner FTP Paginated 1_C.doc

Winter 2009]

2/20/2009 8:27 AM

A New Era of Tax Enforcement

417

vice, and open dialogue as a first response to conflicts.170 When the
offer of cooperation is met with compliance by taxpayers, toxic
feelings, including antagonism, resentment, and distrust, can be
diffused. This, in turn, enables the tax authority to (re)connect
with taxpayers on a positive level so as to eventually elicit voluntary
compliance.171
In cases where the offer of cooperation from the tax authority is
not met with compliance, tax officials must be firm, but also fair, in
bringing to account those who remain defiant. Whatever steps the
tax administration takes must not, as much as possible, adversely
affect compliant taxpayers or escalate existing conflicts beyond
what is necessary to gain compliance.172 Maintaining open communication and positive and professional service even through the
toughest encounters with taxpayers becomes instrumental to effective enforcement. Such strategies not only help protect the
integrity of the tax system and administration, but they are also
valuable in order to turn taxpayer resistance into cooperation. According to available evidence, in most cases, even when taxpayers
hold resentment and anger toward the tax system and administration, they also hold goodwill that creates an opportunity to draw
out the more cooperative motivational postures and behaviors.173
The main question therefore is not whether the tax administration
should punish taxpayers who are noncompliant. Rather, it is how
the administration can balance punitive enforcement against
other, more constructive, measures to address existing noncompliance while also nurture relationships of partnership and
cooperation with the taxpayer community.174
The next Part of this Article will draw on the Australian experience beginning in the late 1990s to suggest that an effective
approach to achieving taxpayer compliance, mutual respect, and
sustainable cooperation includes a hierarchy of lesser sanctions
170. Id. (explaining that trying cooperation remains the best first choice for achieving
the goal of changing motivational postures to more compliant ones but adding that offering
cooperation to non-compliers may not always be the response that regulators want to make);
see also supra notes 163–164 and accompanying text (citing literature on reciprocity).
171. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 412.
172. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 57.
173. For example, according to survey information, while 87 percent of taxpayers who
were caught investing in mass marketed tax schemes in the late 1990s were highly resistant
in 2002, about 93 percent of them also articulated clear committed views. Murphy & Byng,
supra note 133, at 11. For discussions on the transition from taxpayer resistance to cooperation via the implementation of more cooperative and better tailored administrative
practices, see Murphy, supra note 162, and more generally, Sagit Leviner, An Overview: A New
Era of Tax Enforcement-From “Big Stick” to Responsive Regulation, 2 Regulation & Governance
360, 371–72 (2008).
174. Murphy, supra note 158, at 564, 589.
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and regulatory interventions, the possibility of severe and certain
sanctions for noncompliance in the background, and a broad understanding of taxpayers’ motivational postures.
B. Responsive Regulation and the Australian Compliance Pyramid
“Through incentives and threats and public statements of what the
community considers proper and improper, the law is used as an instrument to shape and maintain behavior.” 175
“The model of the regulatory pyramid suggests regulatory strategies,
while the social rift model describes the posturing of those subject to regulation. The ATO Compliance Model brings these different sides of the
regulatory relationship together to summarize the process of conflict escalation, not with the intention of avoiding conflict so much as
managing it.” 176
Until the mid-1990s, the regulatory style of the Australian Tax Office, like the regulatory approach of most tax administrations in the
industrial world, was authoritarian.177 This regulatory method, commonly referred to as “enforced compliance” or “command and
control regulation,” developed out of the economics of crime and
compliance paradigm. It called for the establishment of optimal,
clear-cut rules for taxpayers to follow and the forceful enforcement
of these rules through the threat of detection and legal punishment.178
Despite its widespread dominance, opponents of command and
control often argue that this strategy misinterprets human behavior
and the meaning of noncompliance, and that its one-solution-fits-all
approach is poorly suited for regulating compliance.179 The many
complexities of the tax compliance problem suggest the need for a
comprehensive strategy of enforcement that fosters long-term compliance. Yet “[a]n approach which relies simply on detecting non175. Carroll, supra note 121, at 44.
176. Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 413.
177. Valerie Braithwaite, A New Approach to Tax Compliance, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 1, 1 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); Jenny Job &
David Honaker, Short-Term Experience with Responsive Regulation in the Australian Taxation Office,
in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 111, 111–13 (Valerie
Braithwaite ed., 2003).
178. Job & Honaker, supra note 177, at 112.
179. See, e.g., Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26; Bardach & Kagan, supra note 111;
Neil Gunningham & Peter Grabosky, Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental
Policy (1998); Braithwaite, supra note 167; Malcolm K. Sparrow, The Regulatory
Craft (2000).
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compliance and imposing sanctions on detected non-compliers will
tend to be short term in its effect and increasingly resource intensive.”180 The Australian tax administration took to heart the criticisms
of the command and control method. With the release of the 1998
Cash Economy Task Force Report, the administration embraced a
new approach to enforcement that shifted the regulatory emphasis
from authoritarian deterrence to a method of responsive regulation.181
In their 1992 book entitled Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
Deregulation Debate, Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite conceptualize responsive regulation as an approach that does not suggest any
definitive program or a set of perceptions prescribing a single best
way to regulate. Instead, Ayres and Braithwaite envision responsive
regulation as a method that advances the proposition that regulation
should be context-dependent and yield different solutions depending on the regulatory circumstances at hand.182 An administration
that adopts responsive regulation commits itself to investigating and
taking into consideration the problems, motivations, and circumstances of the regulated parties. It is an administration that
emphasizes dynamic operation, assumes commitment to assisting the
regulated actors in their compliance efforts, and strives to enforce
compliance across the board, even when the regulated are highly
resistant.183 At the same time, there is also less reliance on strategies
that are based only on threat of detection and legal penalties.184
Ayres and Braithwaite utilize the principles of responsive regula185
tion to offer a holistic model for regulating compliance. An
expanded version of their model was endorsed in the 1998 report of
the Australian Cash Economy Tax Force, after which it was adopted
across the board for regulating tax compliance in Australia.186 The
Australian compliance model is represented by a pyramid with each
of its three faces articulating one key aspect of compliance.187 These
include: (1) the motivational postures taxpayers are most likely to
180. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 47.
181. See generally id. The ATO started by examining enforcement in the building and
construction industries where evidence suggested a high level of cash transactions. See Job &
Honaker, supra note 177; Neal Shover, Jenny Job & Anne Carroll, The ATO Compliance Model
in Action: A Case Study of Building and Construction, in Taxing Democracy, Understanding
Tax Avoidance and Evasion 159 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003). For the concept of responsive regulation, see generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26. See also infra notes
182–184 and accompanying text.
182. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 5.
183. Id. at 35–40, 47–51.
184. Id. at 4–5.
185. See, e.g., id. at 35–40.
186. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 22–26.
187. Id.
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hold toward the tax system and its administration and display in
188
their interactions; (2) the enforcement strategies at the tax administration’s disposal; and (3) corresponding regulatory tools.189 In
this model, the motivational postures, regulatory measures, and enforcement mechanisms have a range of severity. The cooperative
postures, lenient enforcement strategies, and less intrusive regulatory styles are set closer to the base of the pyramid. The areas higher
on the model are reserved for defiant postures and for harsher and
more authoritarian enforcement and regulatory practices.190
The Australian Compliance Pyramid
Adapted from the 1998 Australian Cash Economy Tax Force Report
FULL FORCE OF THE LAW

Game Playing
Complying according to
self-interest

Command Regulation
Nondiscretionary

Disengagement
Decided not to
comply

Command Regulation
Discretionary
Resistance
Don’t want to
comply
Capitulation
Try to comply,
but do not always
succeed

DETER BY DETECTION
Audit
With/ Without
Penalty

Enforced
Self Regulation

HELP TO COMPLY
Real Time Examinations/
Record Keeping Review

Self
Regulation
Commitment
Willing to do
the “right
thing”

MOTIVATIONAL POSTURES

MAKE IT EASY
Education/
Record Keeping/ Service Delivery

ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES

REGULATORY STYLES

188. See supra Part IV.A.
189. See supra note 186. But see Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 36; John Braithwaite, Large Business and the Compliance Model, in Taxing Democracy, Understanding Tax
Avoidance and Evasion 177, 178 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003) (explaining that the idea
behind the compliance model is to offer strategies and knowledge as to how to go about
enhancing tax compliance. It is not a recipe but a model to guide strategic thinking); see also
Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 408–09 (“[What is important] is not the content of the enforcement pyramid but its form. Different kinds of sanctioning are appropriate
to different regulatory arenas.”).
190. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 24–26; see also Ayres &
Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 35–40.
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The tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, a familiar practice in law and economics and the game theory literature,191 was introduced into the
compliance model as the actual means for regulating responsively.192 In adopting the compliance model, with its TFT
methodology, the ATO rejected the more traditional deterrence
style of enforcement that is grounded in a static calculation of the
probability of compliance based on the expected size and risk of
punishment. Now, the ATO seeks to balance positive persuasion
and encouragement with punitive deterrence and incapacitation in
a dynamic fashion.193 It embraces the understanding that people
care about different things in different contexts and that they often possess multiple—even contradictory—selves: people can have
a caring, socially-responsible self as well as an opportunistic self.
Monetary considerations may motivate individuals at one point and
a sense of social responsibility at another.194 Accordingly, an enforcement strategy grounded in punishment or persuasion alone is
fundamentally deficient as it will either undermine the good will of
taxpayers or be exploited by their sense of greed.195 Both persuasion and punishment have strengths and shortcomings in
delivering compliance. The key to successful regulation is therefore not to decide between one approach or the other but to
establish a workable compromise between the two such that these
strategies complement each other.196
When utilizing the TFT methodology, the tax administration balances encouragement and persuasion with punitive deterrence
through three stages of communication with the taxpayer: cooperation, toughness, and forgiveness.197 At the heart of this approach
is the understanding that the tax administration and the taxpayer
191. Robert Axelrod & William D. Hamilton, The Evolution of Cooperation 211 Science
1390, 1393–94 (1981); Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (1984).
192. See generally Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 19–53.
193. See, e.g., id. at 51.
194. Braithwaite, supra note 137.
195. See generally Braithwaite, supra note 25 (discussing the need and feasibility of balancing punishment against persuasion in the context of the coal mining industry). See also
supra note 173 and accompanying text (examining the case of the mass marketed tax
scheme investors).
196. Id.; see also Braithwaite & Braithwaite, supra note 111, at 405 (“Decades of research
on regulatory rule enforcement prompted a battle of sorts between those who favor a deterrence approach and those who promote compliance approaches, between punishment and
persuasion. Now the debate has changed focus to ‘how to get the right mix of the two.’ ”); cf.
Smith, supra note 119, at 229 (“If a balance of strategies emphasizing both positive incentives and the detection and punishment of non-compliance is to be effective, then the two
strategies must symbiotically reinforce each other, rather than detract from each other.”).
197. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21. The method of balancing positive service with punitive deterrence coincides quite nicely with the idea of implementing a
preventative approach discussed earlier. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text.
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are partners in an ongoing relationship and that they impact and
198
affect one another. The tax administration therefore works to
initiate each interaction with the taxpayer at the bottom of the
compliance pyramid where it assumes the taxpayer holds cooperative postures and accordingly relies on self-regulation and means of
assistance and encouragement.199 In this way, the tax administration
first appeals to the social responsibility of the taxpayer in order to
foster and maintain compliance. The administration aims to cultivate relationships of good citizenship, trust and alliance, while
avoiding the use of unnecessary punitive measures that might undermine the goodwill and intrinsic motivations of the taxpayer to
voluntarily comply.200 If the taxpayer chooses to cooperate, tax officials must remain at the bottom of the pyramid and embrace
201
cooperation. If the taxpayer decides not to cooperate, TFT instructs the tax administration to move proportionally higher on the
model, incrementally generating more authoritarian means of enforcement and regulation.202
By communicating its capacity and willingness to get tougher
with cheaters, the tax administration taps into the economics of
crime and compliance paradigm. It raises the cost of noncompliance and encourages the taxpayer to choose her socially
responsible, law-abiding self over her opportunistic self. This, in
turn, increases the effectiveness of persuasion and encouragement
at the bottom of the pyramid.203 However, by implementing the
TFT strategy, whereby the tax administration is both tough and
forgiving, the administration does more than merely escalate enforcement and regulation in response—and in proportion—to
taxpayer defiance. It also dynamically manages the relationship
(and conflicts) with the taxpayer by leaving the option of cooperation always within reach. As soon as the taxpayer chooses
cooperation, the TFT strategy instructs the tax administration to
198. Accordingly, the TFT strategy commands, among other things, that there be an
open communication channel between the administration and the taxpayer in which the tax
authority explains the legal obligations of the taxpayer and the consequences for noncompliance, and that the imposition of these consequences depends on the behavior of the
taxpayer. Cf. Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 57; see also Feld & Frey, Tax
Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract, supra note 110 (conceptualizing a psychological contract between the government and taxpayers, in which taxpayers not only
expect to receive certain returns on the taxes they pay but also for the authorities to treat
them with dignity and consideration).
199. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21; see also Braithwaite, supra note 167,
at 30.
200. See supra notes 110–111.
201. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 21.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 26–27.
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reward cooperative behavior by gradually moving down the pyramid and de-escalating enforcement and regulation.204
The triangular makeup of the Australian model with its wide
base and narrow top implies that a substantial proportion of individual taxpayers are positioned closer to the bottom of the
pyramid, or, in other words, that most people generally want to
comply with their tax obligations.205 Fewer taxpayers are assumed to
be involved in more serious forms of noncompliance and, there206
fore, located higher on the model. Evidence on individual tax
compliance suggests that these predictions are generally accurate.
Survey information from the U.S. and Australia indicates, for example, that about two-thirds of individual taxpayers intend to pay
their taxes in full,207 results that are supported by the current level
208
of U.S. tax compliance, standing as high as 83.7 percent. At the
same time, however, this evidence suggests that approximately onethird of taxpayers do not necessarily plan to comply.
In order to safeguard a culture of obedience to the law, if taxpayers follow through with noncompliance, sanctions must remain
severe and certain. The height of the compliance pyramid and its
array of regulatory and enforcement measures express both the
ability and willingness of the tax administration to escalate enforcement and regulation. This signals to the taxpayer that the
administration holds a credible commitment “never to give in.”209
With this commitment, the tax administration communicates to
taxpayers that it will be cooperative as its first choice but that, if the
taxpayer resists cooperation, it will use a heavier hand until compliance is gained.210
204. Id. at 21; see also Braithwaite, supra note 167, at 30–31.
205. Braithwaite, supra note 177, at 5; see also Braithwaite & Job, supra note 140, at 2.
Compare the case of large corporate compliance displaying more of an age-shaped model
than a pyramid. Here, most taxpayers will actively seek to minimize their taxes yet generally
implementing legal, as opposed to illegal means, such that they be located in the midsection
of the model. Braithwaite, supra note 189, at 179–80.
206. Braithwaite, supra note 177, at 5.
207. Braithwaite, supra note 189, at 179 (citation omitted).
208. See, e.g., supra note 7 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the current rate of compliance remains fairly consistent with the rates estimated almost twenty years ago.
Lederman, supra note 164, at 1009 (indicating that 1988 U.S. tax compliance rate was 83
percent).
209. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 40–41 (adding that “the greater the
heights of punitiveness to which an agency can escalate, the greater its capacity to push
regulation down to the cooperative base of the pyramid”). According to Ayres and
Braithwaite, the most severe enforcement and regulatory strategies should be visible so that
taxpayers will perceive the tax administration as having an image of great power or “invincibility.” Id. at 44–47; see also Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 24–25.
210. See, e.g., Cash Economy Task Force 1998, supra note 27, at 26, app.1 at 63 (suggesting that individual personalities matter less when everyone knows that the role of the
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In sum, although the Australian approach emphasizes selfregulation vis-à-vis voluntary compliance, persuasion, and encouragement at the bottom of the pyramid, adoption of the compliance
model does not suggest that the tax administration is reluctant to
identify and punish noncompliers. However, by first offering cooperation rather than disciplinary sanctions, tough enforcement is
expected to be considered more procedurally fair by taxpayers,
and this sense of fairness may better promote alignment and cooperation with the tax administration.211 Often, the mere knowledge
of the tax administration’s willingness and capacity to execute severe punishments will enhance taxpayers’ confidence in the tax
administration and serve as a powerful form of persuasion that furthers a climate of voluntary compliance.212 In the words of Ayres
and Braithwaite: “[R]egulators will be more able to speak softly
when they carry big sticks (and, crucially, a hierarchy of lesser sanctions). Paradoxically, the bigger and more various are the sticks,
213
the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly.”
V. Summary and Conclusions
“My work may have sometimes assumed too much rationality, but I believe it has been an antidote to the extensive research that does not
credit people with enough rationality.” 214
Over the past three and a half decades, understanding the
causes for and facilitators of taxpayer compliance and noncompliance has been the focus of much analysis in tax administration
regulator is to be cooperative first and then to introduce sanctions only when there is no
cooperation). However, one may doubt the feasibility of the tax administration to escalate
and de-escalate enforcement and regulation in everyday situations. See, e.g., Robert Baldwin
and Julia Black, Really Responsive Regulation, 71(1) The Modern Law Review 59, 63–64
(2008) (providing a good critic of responsive regulation generally); Gregory Rawlings, Taxes
and Transactional Treaties: Responsive Regulation and the Reassertion of Offshore Sovereignty, 1 Law
& Pol’y 51 (2007) (discussing the issue of responsive regulation in the international context. Here, the difficulty of escalating enforcement and regulation is most pronounced when
dealing with Offshore Finance Centers (OFC) without having strong enforcement capacity
from the outset. Under such conditions, OFCs can extract protection under state sovereignty and the option of bilateral agreements).
211. See supra notes 110–111, 161.
212. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 40–51; Cash Economy Task Force 1998,
supra note 27, at 25; cf. Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Backfire?
Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance, in Why People Pay Taxes 193 (Joel Slemrod
ed., 1992) (suggesting the importance of effective enforcement that is visible to the taxpaying community).
213. Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 19 (internal citation omitted).
214. Becker, supra note 38, at 402.
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research. Research efforts have been undertaken in the hope of
gaining a better handle on how to foster tax compliance and
minimize the tax gap. In this ever-expanding area of study, important advances have been made in modeling the taxpaying
decisionmaking process and, more recently, exploring the relationship between taxpayers and the tax authority and how this
relationship shapes compliance. These developments were accomplished against the backdrop of a growing body of survey
information, as well as empirical and experimental work. More
than anything, however, the extensive research has demonstrated
that tax noncompliance is a serious and complex problem, subject
to a wide range of causes and influencers.
To a great degree, the economic paradigm dictates efforts to enforce tax compliance. The economic model emphasizes the
consequences of behavior and the extent to which these consequences serve people’s self-interest as the most important
determinants for compliance. According to this model, taxpayers
who fail to comply with their tax obligations are not manifesting
antisocial or deviant characteristics. These taxpayers are simply rational actors who attempt to maximize their expected utility given
the costs and benefits associated with the courses of action available to them. Enforcement techniques drawing on the economic
model, therefore, look to decrease the expected utility of noncompliance by increasing the probability or the severity of punishment
for offenders, thereby deterring potential lawbreakers and promoting tax compliance as the rational (meaning, beneficial) choice of
behavior.
While the research in compliance is far from conclusive, it does
appear to support the economic model to the extent that taxpayers
are generally sensitive to the expected payoffs of compliant and
noncompliant behavior. Other things being equal, taxpayers who
face higher probabilities of detection or punishment tend to comply more than those who face lower risks. Increasingly, however,
there is a growing understanding among tax researchers and administrators that there is more to compliance than the probability
and severity of punishment. A host of considerations influence
taxpayers, including the desires to comply with social norms, to be
honest citizens, to avoid the psychological stress attached to dullards with the tax authority, and to correct perceived injustices in
the tax system.
Understanding the reasons for and influences on taxpayer behaviors has a direct impact on the design of enforcement policies
and their capacity to improve compliance. If taxpayers care about
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matters beyond narrowly defined self-interest, applying enforcement strategies that rely exclusively on monetary considerations—
particularly through authoritarian deterrence of detection and
punishment—might not only be ineffective. Such an approach
could also backfire by undermining the goodwill and intrinsic motivations of taxpayers to comply, generating distrust and
antagonism, and ultimately exacerbating (rather than easing) the
problem of noncompliance. Instead of abandoning enforcement
policies based on detection and punishment, these enforcement
mechanisms should be balanced against other measures that will
complement punitive deterrence and offset its negative repercussions. This Article has advanced the proposition that this balance
can be achieved by broadening the definition of deterrence to include measures that nurture the social responsibility and ethics of
taxpayers and that aim to encourage tax compliance as well as discourage noncompliance.
The Australian compliance model offers a framework that incorporates a balanced and forward-looking approach to the
enforcement of taxes such as just described. Drawing on the principles of responsive regulation and the motivational posturing
doctrine, the Australian model conceptualizes behavior not only as
a result of the needs, desires, and constraints of an autonomous
taxpayer but it also considers that the taxpayer is heavily influenced by environmental conditions, including norms, values, and
habits, and by the nature of the taxpayer/tax-authority interaction.
By emphasizing the role that this interaction plays in shaping taxpayer behavior, the tax administration is empowered to own up to
its administrative responsibilities and explore the different ways in
which it can manage this relationship. The idea here is not only to
enforce compliance where it is deficient. The idea is to also
strengthen and manage compliance fairly and efficiently, such that
voluntary reporting improves both in scope and duration. The
emphasis on voluntary reporting is especially important in taxation
given that the tax law is constantly changing and is often complex
and vulnerable to manipulation. Instead of putting endless efforts
into meeting unrealistic expectations of compliance, enforcement
policies might be more effective if they emphasize self-regulation
through assistance and persuasion, and only when necessary shift
to punitive enforcement and intrusive regulation.
The Australian compliance model makes a case for the superiority of an enforcement strategy that is gradual and proportional in
its capacity and willingness to apply sanctions. It represents a move
away from static deterrence advocated by early economic theorists
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and embraces a dynamic framework that reflects the interplay of
the taxpayer/tax-authority interaction. Accordingly, the regulatory
goal is no longer to identify a particular recipe for optimal deterrence, but instead to find an optimal way to play “the enforcement
game.”215 An administration that endorses the Australian approach,
employing its tit-for-tat methodology, plays the enforcement game
responsively. It works to protect the taxpayer community against
lawbreakers while leaving room for the fostering tax morale.
With growing interest around the world in tax administration that
focuses on customer service, and embracing a dynamic approach to
the study and enforcement of compliance, the Australian compliance model has the potential to generate different—possibly more
effective—conclusions regarding tax enforcement than what we
have seen thus far from the traditional economic analysis of compliance. In fact, the Australian model can be viewed as yet another
advancement of the economic paradigm to the extent that it draws
on the principles of rational behavior. The Australian approach
takes a step further, however, and supplements the economic interpretation to tax enforcement with other theories, particularly
those that involve taxpayer identity, conflict escalation, and procedural justice. The extent to which this approach yields different
enforcement dynamics or better compliance results than the traditional economic paradigm, however, has yet to be fully determined.
The essence of the Australian approach lies in its underlying principles and dynamic methodology rather than in any specific
enforcement and regulatory tools or mechanisms. And, while its
open-ended regulatory design may be a key advantage, it might
also become its main weakness.
The Australian model, by relying on a method that emphasizes
the process of enforcement (“managing relationships”) rather than
any one defined regulatory or enforcement mechanism, presents
challenges in its practical application. Considerable resources are
needed to develop the range of regulatory and enforcement
measures required for different industries, to test the effectiveness
of each measure, and to fit the various measures into the model as
a whole. It is unclear, for example, which regulatory and
enforcement tools best encourage voluntary compliance at the
bottom of the pyramid, how the tax administration can effectively
(and efficiently) present the repercussions of noncompliance to
taxpayers such that they are encouraged to comply early in the
regulatory process, which deterrent measures can be carried out
(and to what extent) without unnecessarily alienating taxpayers,
215.

Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 26, at 51.
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and how incapacitation can be achieved in taxation through
measures other than prosecution and incarceration.
In addition, to generalize the Australian model to tax administrations in other countries, more work is needed to identify
relevant compliance problems, to understand the characteristics of
local taxpayer communities, and to explore the political and societal support for different enforcement and regulatory strategies. All
these issues and others may be addressed partly through the trial
and error of enforcement efforts and partly through empirical and
experimental work. The responsiveness of the Australian model may
become especially problematic, however, if tax agents and administrators interpret and apply the model in ways that are inappropriate
or otherwise unintended by the supporting enforcement policy. This
risk is inherent in administrative practices generally, but the combination of an escalating range of enforcement and regulation, the
complex and fluid nature of motivational postures, and the extent
of discretion in a dynamic administrative style of interaction might
lead to overly lenient or harsh enforcement compared to a more
conventional approach.
At the end of the day, the main advantage of the Australian
model may be its ability to offer tax administrators and researchers
a broad, even if incomplete, roadmap for tax enforcement that incorporates a set of checks and balances on punitive deterrence.
Furthermore, the Australian model touches on critical issues in
compliance and regulation that are well deserving of policy attention and debate. The fact that this model does not come with a selfexplanatory guide may not necessarily be a disadvantage, as it
forces tax administrators and policymakers to debate and reach
decisions in a deliberate and intentional manner. In a few years, as
the Australian tax administration continues releasing compliance
improvement data and different prototypes of the original compliance model are developed in Australia and elsewhere, we may be
in a better position to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of
the responsive approach to taxation and, particularly, the role it
plays in increasing the integrity of the tax system. In the meantime,
more efforts should be devoted to the undertaking of comparative
work that investigates the relevance of responsive regulation to
U.S. tax administration,216 to test the hypotheses of the Australian
model, and to generate important insights and advances in both
the theoretical analysis and the empirical research of compliance.
216. E.g., John Braithwaite, Markets in Vice, Markets in Virtue (2005) (examining the application of responsive regulation to area of corporate taxation in Australia and
the United States).

http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art64

48

Leviner:
Leviner FTP Paginated 1_C.doc

Winter 2009]

2/20/2009 8:27 AM

A New Era of Tax Enforcement

429

Until we have more information, we should be careful not to dismiss what could be the promising beginning of a new era of tax
enforcement.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2009

49

